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MUNICIPAL POWER TO TAX-
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU*
Throughout the United States a great many municipalities have
found that in recent years their revenue from taxes has not kept up
with their expenses. While inflation spiralled municipal costs, while
d rnands for municipal services increased terrifically during the last
few" decades, and while financial burdens, such as the three-platoon
fire department, were readily imposed upon the municipal corporations
by the state legislatures, the tax bases available to municipalities were
too often insufficient to meet the expanding local requirements. Older
taxes, such as the tax upon real property, have proved more and more
inadequate as residents moved beyond city limits, not only thereby
depriving the municipalities of property taxes but often leaving
behind only greatly depreciated properties. At the same time
municipal corporations found many sources of tax revenue being pre-
erfipted by the federal and state governments. Lastly, the municipal
corporations have quite generally been underrepresented in state legis-
latures with an unhappy effect upon applications for new powers to
tax. Basically, then, municipal corporations are inhibited in raising
rvenue by taxes first of all by lack of power and, secondly, by the
force and effect of federal and state constitutional limitations. This
paper is devoted to a study of the principles governing municipal power
to tax and its constitutional limitations.
Power to tax
.The power to tax is generally not considered inherent in municipal
corporations.1 However, in 1878 Mr. Justice Field of the United
States Supreme Court indicated that to him taxation was an essential
or: inherent power of every municipal corporation. Said he:
"A municipality without the power of taxation would be a body
"4vithout life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purpose."
JuStice Field added:
"When such a corporation is created, the power of taxation is vested
in it, as an essential attribute, for all the purposes of its existence,
* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; Author, ANTIEAU ON MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONs (II vols., 1955, Mathew Bender & Co., New York), Seasongood
Cases on Municipal Corporations (3d ed., 1953).
1. Village of Lombard v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 405 Ill. 209, 90 N.E.2d 105
(1950); Carter Carburetor Co. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947).;
"It is an established rule of law that the power to tax is not inherent in a
municipal corporation." Eugene Theater Co. v. City of Eugene, 194 Ore. 603,
:243 P.2d 1060, 1067 (1952); Walker v. Morgantown, 71 S.E.2d 60 (W. Va. 1952).
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unless its exercise be in express terms prohibited. For the accom-:
plishment of these purposes, its authorities, however limited, the-
corporation, must have power to raise money and control its expendi-.
ture."2
There are a few other cases to the same effect in which courts have
implied a municipal power to tax, usually from granted powers to
erect buildings and to contract debts, but they are in the distinct
minority.3 The doctrine of inherent municipal power to tax cannot be
accepted as a general proposition and it is not the law anywhere today
except possibly in California, and the result there is really posited
upon constitutional home rule.4
Power to tax must be found in constitutions, charters and statutes.
Constitutional municipal power to tax exists in some of the so-called
home rule states. Thus, in California 5 and in Ohio6 the constitutional
home rule provisions are deemed to confer directly upon municipal
corporations the power of taxation for municipal affairs and purposes.
Even in the "constitutional" home rule states considerable variations
in municipal power to tax can be found. For instance, in California
municipal corporations can impose any "municipal" tax unaffected
by general laws of the state legislature on the same subject and limited
only by express inhibitions contained in the municipal charter.7 In
Ohio municipal corporations can impose any tax not prohibited by
general laws or pre-empted by a similar state tax. Illustratively, the
Ohio Supreme Court without any legislative grant recognized the
power of Toledo under the home rule clause of the state's constitution
to impose a municipal income tax.8 On the other hand, in Missouri the
municipal corporations must seemingly find power either in an express
provision in the charter or in a legislative grant.9 Thus, the Missouri
Supreme Court has denied home rule cities power to impose particular
taxes on the theory that the people of the community had not
authorized in their charter the imposition of these taxes upon them-
selves.10 Whereas in home rule California the charter is only a limita-
2. United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381, 393 (1878).
3. Taylor v. McFadden, 84 Iowa 262, 50 N.W. 1070 (1892); Oconto v. OcontQ
City Water Co., 105 Wis. 76, 80 N.W. 1113 (1899).
4. Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949).
5. In re Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 74 Pac. 780 (1903); Franklin v. Peterson, 87
Cal, App. 2d 727, 197 P.2d 788 (1948); Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211
P.2d 564 (1949).
6. Andrews Espy Realty v. Burton-Rodgers Inc., 94 Ohio App. 417, 116 N.E.2d
14 (1952).
7. See cases cited in note 5, supra.
8. Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950). See also Zielonka
v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919) (occupation tax).
9. Carter Carburetor Co. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947);
Kansas City v. Frogge, 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943); cf. Siemens v.
Shreve, 317 Mo. 736, 296 S.W. 415 (1927).




tion upon municipal power to tax, in home rule Missouri it becomes
the source of power to tax and, hence, when the charter does not
mention power to impose a particular tax there is no municipal power,
unless, as in non-home rule states, the legislature can be importuned
into granting power. And in practice begging the legislature may be
less difficult than educating the people to amend the charter. In the
"non-constitutional" home rule states, such as Pennsylvania and Michi-
gan, the home rule corporations receive their power to tax from
statutory grants.
, Municipal power to tax in non-home rule states depends upon
legislative grant. Illustratively, the West Virginia Supreme Court
remarks: "A municipality being without inherent power to levy taxes,
if such power exists, it must be delegated by the legislature."'1 Some-
times, as in that state, the statutory grant makes municipal power to
impose certain levies, such as license taxes, hinge upon the licensing
of the same activity or occupation by the state.12 In theory, from an
express grant to tax additional powers can be implied if absolutely
necessary but there is no great judicial willingness to expand the
legislative grants. Typically the Oregon Supreme Court states:
"The principle is universal that whenever a municipality . . . seeks
-to, impose the burden of taxation. upon a citizen or upon his property,
it must be able to show the grant of such power by express words or
necessary implication. No doubtful inference from other powers
granted or from obscure provisions of the law, nor mere matter of
convenience, or even necessity, will answer the purpose. The grant
relied upon must be evident and unmistakable, and all doubts will be
resolved against its exercise, and in favor of the taxpayer."13
Even courts in home rule states have applied this same rule of neces-
sary inference. For instance, the Missouri Supreme Court has an-
nounced: "Power to tax is an extraordinary one which does not inhere
in municipal corporations and will not be implied unless the implica-
tion be necessary and the grant unmistakable."'14 These courts should
re-examine the rule and inquire if the principle governing grants by
the legislature is equally applicable when the grant is from the people
to their own officers, which is the case in home rule charters, or when
the grant to the municipal corporation comes from an amendment to
the state constitution passed to expand liberally municipal powers.
It is a fundamental proposition of municipal law that the power to
11. Walker v. Morgantown, 71 S.E.2d 60, 63 W.Va. (1952).
12. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 497 (1949): "Whenever anything, for which a state
license is required, is to be done within such town the council may, unless
prohibited by law, require a municipal license therefor, and may impose a tax
thereon for the use of the town."
13. Corbett v. Portland, 31 Ore. 407, 48 Pac. 428, 429 (1897).
.14. Carter Carburetor Co. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438, 441
(1947).
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impose license taxes for revenue will not be implied from the munici-
pal power to regulate by licensing.15 Courts are also everywhere
agreed that the municipal power to tax is to be construed strictly
against the municipal corporation and in favor of the taxpayer.
16
Typically the Pennsylvania Supreme Court states:
"Neither municipalities nor school districts are sovereigns; they have
no original or fundamental power of legislation or of taxation. They
have the right and power to enact only those legislative and tax
ordinances or resolutions which are authorized by an act of the legis-
lature; and if such ordinance or resolution is unauthorized, or conflicts
with the enabling statute or with some of its provisions it is in that
respect or to that extent void,.... Moreover, the grant of the right or
power to levy taxes must be strictly construed; tax statutes should
receive a strict construction and in cases of reasonable doubt, the
construction should be against the government."17
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is applied to legisla-
tive grants of tax powers to municipal corporations. 18 Thus, power to
levy particular taxes by implication rules out power to levy others.19
In other words, it is assumed that the state legislature by grant has
given all that it intended should be exercised by the municipality.2
°
Typically, when the granted power was authority to impose property
taxes, St. Louis was denied power to impose an earnings tax.2 1 Again,
power to impose occupation taxes rules out an additional power to
impose license taxes upon the owners of autmobiles.2
There are literally hundreds of municipal taxes which have been
judicially invalidated because the courts concluded there was no
15. Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d, 721 (1941).; Chicago v.
R & X Restaurant, 369 Ill. 65, 15 N.E.2d 725 (1938); Lyons v. Minneapolis, 63
N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1954); Solomon v. Jersey City, 12 N.J. 379, 97 A.2d 405
(1953).
16. Gotlieb v. Birmingham, 243 Ala. 579, 11 So. 2d, 363 (1943); "The grant ...
is to be strictly construed. Where municipal authority to tax is doubtful, the
doubt is to be resolved against the tax and in favor of the taxpayer," Eugene
Theater Co. v. City of Eugene, 194 Ore. 603, 243 P.2d 1060, 1067 (1952); Wil-
liams v. Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 14 S.E.2d 287 (1941); "Statutes delegating
power to municipalities to levy taxes must be construed strictly, and if any
doubt exists, it should be resolved against the municipality and in favor of the
taxpayer." Walker v. Morgantown, 71 S.E.2d 60, 63 (W. Va. 1952).
17. Appeal of School District of City of Allentown, 370 Pa. 161, 87 A.2d
480 (1952).
The rule of strict construction is used at times to deny power to impose double
taxation. "An intent to impose double taxation will not be presumed.... The
presumption of law is against it and continues until overcome by express words
of the Legislature showing such intent." Arrott's Estate, 322 Pa. 367, 185 Atl.
697, 698 (1936).
18. Appeal of Dixon, 138 Pa. Super. 385, 11 A.2d 169 (1940).
19. Decatur Transit Co. v. City of Gadsden, 249 Ala. 314, 31 So. 2d 339 (1947).
20. The authority to tax is not only a delegated authority conferred, by the
state, but it is assumed that the state has given all it intended should be exer-
cised.... ." Eugene Theater Co. v. City of Eugene, 194 Ore. 603, 243 P.2d 1060,
1067 (1952).
21. Carter Carburetor Co. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d, 438 (1947).
22. Ex parte Phillips, 64 Okla. 276, 167 Pac. 221 (1917).
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municipal power to tax. This was so, for instance, in 1950 when mu-
.nicipal corporations in Illinois endeavored to impose gross receipts
taxes upon utilities.23 It was similarly the result when Oklahoma City
endeavored to levy a license tax upon automobiles. 24 A number of
municipal admissions and income taxes have been invalidated because
of lack of power.2 5 Municipal taxes upon the professions have often
been set aside because of lack of power.26 Similarly voided have been
some municipal taxes upon interurban carriers.27 And there is a
noticeable judicial inclination to hold that municipal corporations do
not have the power to impose discriminatory taxes upon non-residents
and out-of-town merchants.23 Again, courts have often ruled munici-
palities had no power to impose taxes upon the property and activities
of other municipal corporations. 29 Illustratively, a borough was ruled
without power to force a school district to collect an admissions tax
upon its athletic events. 30
Although it is, as above indicated, well established that statutes
authorizing municipal corporations to tax are to be construed strictly
against the corporation and in favor of the taxpayer, courts every once
in a while remind us that this should not take precedence over the
fundamental rule that a statute is to be construed in accordance with
its real intent and meaning, and not so strictly as to defeat the legisla-
tive purpose.31 Furthermore, even though the rule of ejusdem generis
is conventionally applied to statutes conferring tax powers upon
municipal corporations, courts can subordinate the rule and permit
reasonable if not liberal constructions. Sustaining Chicago's power to
tax bowling alleys as within a grant of power to tax "amusements," the
Illinois Supreme Court stated:
"In the construction and application of a statute, words are to be given
their generally accepted meaning, unless there is something in the act
indicating that the legislature used them in a different sense.... The
rule of ejusdem generis is only a rule of construction to aid in ascer-
taining and, giving effect to the legislative intent. It cannot be applied
to defeat the evident purpose of the statute or to restrict the scope of
subjects the legislature intended to include within the act." 32
23. Village of Lombard, v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 405 Ill. 209, 90 N.E.2d 105
(1950).
24. Ex parte Phillips, supra note 22.
25. Eugene Theater Co. v. City of Eugene, 194 Ore. 603, 243 P.2d 1060 (1952).
26. State ex rel. Cole v. Keller, 129 Fla. 276, 176 So. 176 (1937); Siemens
v. Shreve, 317 Mo. 737, 296 S.W. 415 (1927).
27. Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334, 197 S.W. 686 (1917); Parker v. Silverton,
109 Ore. 298, 220 Pac. 139 (1923).
28. Decatur Transit Co. v. City of Gadsden, 249 Ala. 314, 31 So.2d 339 (1947).
29. Collector of Taxes of Milton v. Boston, 278 Mass. 274, 180 N.E. 116 (1932)
The matter is covered more fully in the following section.
30. Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg School Dist., 365 Pa. 254, 74 A.2d
138 (1950).
31. Ingalls Iron Works v. Birmingham, 248 Ala. 417, 27 So. 2d 788 (1946).
32. Stiska v. Chicago, 405 I1. 374, 90 N.E.2d 742, 745-47 (1950).
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* It is crystal clear that state legislatures can delegate power to tax
to municipal corporations. 33 And it is just as clear that where munici-
pal power to tax depends upon legislative grant the legislature can
modify or terminate the municipal power at will, subject only to
:constitutional provisions such as the contract clause of the United
States Constitution.
34
The courts recognize that though the existence of municipal power
to tax is tested by rules of strict construction these rules do not apply
to questions involving municipal exercise of admitted powers to tax.
So, subject only to constitutional limitation, municipal corporations
with power can determine for themselves the amount of taxes they
will levy.
35
Effect of state pre-emption, prohibition and exemption
Municipal power to impose particular taxes is denied in a number
of states upon the theory that the state has pre-empted a field of
taxation. This doctrine has often been applied in Ohio to deny munici-
pal tax power. To illustrate, the Ohio Supreme Court because of pre-
emption has denied home rule cities power to impose (a) a tax on
charges by utilities,36 (b) a tax upon gasoline filling stations, 37 and (c)
a vehicle license tax.38 Probably the most frequent application of the
pre-emption doctrine is found in Pennsylvania. There, for example,
the existence of an identical or even similar state tax has been held to
preclude municipal levies (a) upon corporate property,39 (b) upon cor-
porate income,40 (c) upon the privilege of using tangible property,41
and (d) upon the tower of a television company.4 Nevertheless, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that even though a taxpayer
is subjected to the state property tax, he can be forced to respond to a
municipal mercantile license tax.43 Pittsburgh has also been sustained
33. Reference should, be made to the Pennsylvania Home Rule Taxation Act,
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 2015.1 (Purdon Supp. 1949) for what is probably the
broadest grant. It permits municipal corporations to tax anything not taxed
by the state. Its constitutionality was affirmed in English v. Robinson Tp. Sch.
Dist., 358 Pa. 45, 55 A.2d 803 (1947).
34. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (U.S. 1867).
35. "A different rule applies in testing the exercise of a power to tax, from
that which applies in determining the existence of such power. If the power
exists, then the legislative body has the right to finally determine the amount
or rate of a tax, in the absence of constitutional prohibitions. It may levy a tax
of any amount it sees fit." Eugene Theater Co. v. City of Eugene, 194 Ore. 603,
243 P.2d 1060, 1067 (1952).
36. Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 65 (1946).
37. Cincinnati v. Oil Works Co., 123 Ohio St. 448, 175 N.E. 699 (1931).
38. Firestone v. Cambridge, 113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925).
39. Dick Contracting Co. v. Hazle Tp. Sch. Dist., 362 Pa. 387, 65 A.2d 381
(1949),
40. Murray v. Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 71 A.2d 280 (1950).
41. Hampton v. Township Sch. Dist., 362 Pa. 395, 67 A.2d 376 (1949).
42. The court reas6ned that the telecasting company paid a state-imposed
capital stock tax which it deemed a tax on the property of the corporation.
Panther Valley TV Co. v. Borough of Summit Hill, 376 Pa. 375, 102 A.2d 699
(1954).
43. National Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, 374 Pa. 604, 98 A.2d 182 (1953).
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in imposing its amusement tax upon taverns having liquor licenses and
amusement permits from the state." Similarly, the California Su-
preme Court has held that notwithstanding the state constitutional
provision that the state shall have exclusive control over the sale of
liquor, the state has not pre-empted the taxation of liquor distributors
so that municipal corporations can at least impose upon such retailers
of liquor the collection of municipal "purchase and use" taxes.45 On
the other hand, local statutes giving state boards and commissions
plenary regulatory powers over certain occupations or activities may
be interpreted to preclude municipal power to tax. Thus, the Oregon
Supreme Court has held that an intercity carrier subject to the regula-
tion of the state commission could not be subjected to a three hundred
dollar annual municipal license tax.
46
Even municipal corporations having quite broad power to tax are
at times denied power to impose particular levies. To illustrate, muni-
cipal power to tax vehicles is denied in a number of states.47 In
Missouri all cities have been denied power to impose sales taxes.4
Even in home rule states such as this it is usually theorized that taxes,
especially where they can be imposed upon non-residents of the
municipal corporation, are matters of "general" rather than "local"
concern and hence subject to the paramountcy of the state.49 Jtiliza-
tion of legislative denials of power obviously constitute a greater limi-
tation than the doctrine of pre-emption for, in the former, even though
a tax source has not been tapped by the state it is effectively denied to
the municipal corporation.
In addition to states withholding power to impose certain kinds of
taxes, municipal corporations are regularly subject to state denials of
authority to impose taxes upon particular individuals and properties.
Some constitutions directly exempt certain properties.50 Others
44. Puntureri v. Pittsburgh, 170 Pa. 159, 84 A.2d, 516 (1951).
45. Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d, 564 (1949).
46. Parker v. City of Silverton, 109 Ore. 298, 220 Pac. 139 (1923).
47. All Minnesota cities are denied power to impose taxes upon motor
vehicles for which the owner has a permit from the state. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
168.013, subd. 9 (Supp. 1954). Duluth v. Northland, Greyhound Lines, 236
Minn. 260, 52 N.W.2d 774 (1952). See also Ex parte Phillips, 64 Okla. 276, 167
Pac. 221 (1917).
48. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71.610 (1949).
49. Carter Carburetor Co. v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947);
Kansas City v. Frogge, 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943); Siemens v. Shreve,
317 Mo. 736, 296 S.W. 415 (1927).
50. E.g., ARx. CONST., art. XVI, § 5: "Provided, further, that the following
property shall be exempt from taxation: public property used exclusively for
public purposes; churches used as such; cemeteries used exclusively as such;
school buildings and apparatus; libraries and grounds used exclusively for
school purposes; and buildings and grounds and materials used exclusively for
public charity." So, also: ARK. CONST., Amend. 12; Amz. CONST., art. IX, §
2; COLO. CONST., art. X, §§ 4, 5; IDAHO CONST., art. VII, § 4; MONT. CONST., art.
XII, § 2.
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authorize the legislatures to exempt designated classes of property 5 '
The Idaho Constitution is rather alone in giving the legislature au-
thority to allow such exemptions as seem to it necessary and just.
5 2
State exemptions from municipal taxation are as varied as they are
numerous. Georgia, for instance, exempts traveling salesmen who
take orders for goods to be delivered later.53 Pennsylvania exempts
from municipal taxation "quasi-public corporations" and the term is
used to include, railroads, motor carriers, street railways, power, gas
and water utilities. 4 Massachusetts, in imposing its franchise tax, has
exempted "manufacturing corporations" from local taxation and the
exemption has occasioned much litigation as to its scope.55 Maryland
has also withdrawn from Baltimore's personal property tax raw ma-
terials, manufactured products in the hands of manufacturers, and
tools, engines and machinery. This effectively takes from the city ap-
proximately twenty-five percent of its levy. It is extremely doubtful
if such state-imposed exemptions bring or hold industry. Since these
properties are protected by the municipality, state legislatures should
further explore the desirability of subjecting such assets to municipal
taxation.
In most states by constitution or statute, state property is exempt
from local taxation.5 6 In an interesting case, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has decreed that state employees resident in Philadelphia
could be compelled to pay that city's earnings tax. The court pointed
out, however, that the state could refuse the municipal demand that it
furnish the city authorities a list of such employees and that it collect
the tax.5 7 County properties used for necessary governmental purposes
are similarly generally immune from local taxation.5 8 But it has been
held that lands within a village purchased by a county at a tax sale are
not exempt from village taxes.59 Likewise immune from municipal
taxes are the properties of other municipal corporations and local
governmental units, at least if used for public purposes.60 The Massa-
51. IND. CONST., art. X § 1; Miss. CONST., art. VII, § 192; OHIO CONST., art. XII,
§ 2; S.C. CONST., art. X, § 1.
62. IDAHO CONST., art. VII, § 5.
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-4105 (1933). Held. not to prevent a municipal cor-
poration taxing dairymen selling and delivering milk in the city. Rossman
v. City of Moultrie, 189 Ga. 681, 7 S.E.2d 270 (1940).
54. Atlantic Freight Lines v. Rankin, 373 Pa. 517, 96 A.2d, 870 (1953).
55. Commissioner of Corps. v. Boston, 324 Mass. 32, 84 N.E.2d 531 (1949);
City of Boston v. Commissioner of Corps., 323 Mass. 730, 84 N.E.2d 129 (1949).
See also: United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. McCracken County, 265 S.W.2d 929 (Ky.
App. 1953).
56. CoLo. CONST., art. X § 4; IDAHO CONST., art. VII, §4. Town of Weaverville
v. Hobbs, 212 N.C. 684, 194 S.E. 860 (1938).
57. Marson v. Philadelphia, 342 Pa. 369, 21 A.2d 228 (1941).
58. Worcester County v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193 (1874).
59. Herkimer County v. Village of Herkimer, 279 N.Y. 560, 18 N.E.2d 854
(1939).
60. Ford Motor Co. v. Detroit, 267 Mich. 177, 275 N.W. 272 (1934). Included
within this group is usually the municipally-owned utility. Anoka County. v.
St. Paul, 194 Minn. 554, 261 N.W. 588 (1935).
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chusetts court has said in a leading case:
"Property taken or held, for a public use by one muniopality within
the territorial limits of another or within its own boundaries, is not
subject to taxation so long as it is actually devoted, to a public use. The
reason is that property held and used for the benefit of thd public
ought not to be made to share the burden of paying the public
expenses. That exemption does not rest on any provision of statute,
but is founded on general principles of expediency and justice."61
The customary exemptions apply even where the property is located
outside'the city.
62
However, municipal property has been held not exempt when it was
neither actually used for a public purpose nor held with the design
to make such a use within a reasonable time.63 And where a munici-
pality engages in business at times property so used has been held
taxable.6 4 A broader view of municipal exemption is indicated by the
Indiana court which has said:
"Since municipal corporations are authorized and designed to serve
public purposes only, any property which they may acquire in the
exercise of their powers to accomplish such purposes or as an incident
thereto, may lawfully be exempted from taxation."65
The extent of withdrawal of municipal property from taxation by the
municipal corporation itself can be understood by the figures for
New York City where, in total exemptions from taxation of five
billion, six hundred million dollars, city-owned property accounts for
four billion, one hundred million dollars. Note should be taken here
that certain local governmental units have in some states been ruled
not municipal corporations within constitutional exemptions. Such is
the case, for instance, of irrigation districts.6 6
The properties of "religious" organizations are customarily exempt
from municipal taxation. Such exemption precipitates much litigation
as to whether a particular organization qualifies and as much more
controversy as to what percentage of property should be exempted.
67
The same problems frequently exist regarding "scientific," "chari-
table," "educational" organizations and, to a lesser extent, the hospi-
tals, all of which are rather regularly withdrawn from municipal
61. Collector of Taxes of Milton v. Boston, 278 Mass. 274, 180 N.E. 116, 117
(1932).
62. Stewart v. Denver, 70 Colo. 514, 202 Pac. 1085 (1921).
63. Collector of Taxes of Milton v. Boston, 278 Mass. 274, 180 N.E. 116 (1932).
64. Phoenix v. Bowles, 65 Ariz. 315, 180 P.2d 222 (1947).
65. Chadwick v. Crawfordsville, 216 Ind. 399, 24 N.E.2d 937 (1940).
66. Lewiston Orchards Irrig. Dist. v. Gilmore, 53 Idaho 377, 23 P.2d 720
(1933); Buffalo Rapids Irrig. Dist. v. Colleran, 85 Mont. 466, 279 Pac. 369
(1929).
67. See. for example: Dawn Bible Students Ass'n v. Borough of East Ruth-
erford, 3 N.J. Super. 71, 65 A.2d 532 (1949)-; Sisterhood of Holy Nativity v. City
of Newport, 73 R.I. 445, 57 A.2d 184 (1948).
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taxation by state action.68 In the absence of contrary statutory pro-
vision, the general rule is that the exemption extends to all properties
reasonably necessary to the fulfilment of the exempted objective.69
Also quite frequently exempted from municipal taxation are home-
steads,70 housing developments,7 1 and libraries.7 2
Additional state exemptions are at times expressed in terms not
of ownership but according to the nature of the property. Thus, in
Wisconsin, farm machinery is exempt from local taxation by statute.73
In Kentucky and a number of other states "machinery and products in
the course of manufacture" have been withdrawn from municipal
taxes.7 4 "New industrial plants" similarly are immune from taxation
by cities in Maryland and some other states.75 Agricultural produce
grown in the state has been exempted by Georgia.7 6
Exemptions from local taxation must be defined in precise and defi-
nite terms and an exemption cannot successfully rest on ambiguities
or on conjecture as to the policy behind the statute.7 7 It is firmly
established that exemptions will be strictly construed against a person
claiming such an exemption from municipal taxation.7 8 The California
Supreme Court typically states:
"Contract provisions and statutes granting exemption from taxation
are strictly construed to the end that such concessions will be neither
enlarged nor extended beyond the plain meaning of the language
employed."
7 9
To illustrate the rule, a state exemption of "machinery" did not free
from municipal taxation the tower of a telecasting station.80 And state
68. See, for example: Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. Los Angeles County,
35 Cal. 2d 729, 221 P.2d 31 (1950); Forman Schools v. Town of Litchfield, 134
Conn. 1, 54 A.2df 710 (1947); Engineering Society of Detroit v. Detroit, 308
Mich. 539, 14 N.W.2d 79 (1944); Hoboken v. Division of Tax Appeals, 134
N.J.L. 594, 49 A.2d 587 (1946); Croton Community Nursery School v. Coulter,
283 App. Div. 716, 127 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1954) , In re Ogontz School, 361 Pa. 284, 65
A.2d 150 (1949),; Troy, Academy v. Town of Poultney, 115 Vt. 480, 66 A.2d 2
(1949).
69. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221
P.2d 31 (1950) (tennis court for nurses held exempt in connection with hospi-
tal).
70. FLA. CoNST., art. X, § 7. Fort Lauderdale v. Carter, 71 So.2d 260 (Fla.
1954).
71. Laws of Kansas 1953, c. 106. So. also, Wells v. Housing Authority of
Wilmington, 213 N.C. 744, 197 S.E. 693 (1938).
72. COLO. CONST., art. X, § 4; IDAHO CONST., art. VII, § 4.
73. Wis. STAT., § 70.111(9) (1949).
74. Ky. REV. STAT. § 132.200 (4) (Baldwin 1943).
75. Maryland Laws of 1953, c. 18.
76. GA. CODE ANN. § 92.201 (1935).
77. Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Steuben County, 264 App. Div. 945, 36 N.Y.S.2d
440 (1942).
78. Lexington v. Lexington Leader Co., 193 Ky, 107, 235 S.W. 31 (1921); Jer-
sey City v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 14 N.J. 112, 101 A.2d 555 (1953);
Mitchell v. City of Horicon, 264 Wis. 350, 59 N.W.2d 469 (1953).
79. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. Los Angeles County 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221
P.2d 31, 34 (1950).
80. W.A.V.E. v. Louisville, 248 S.W.2d 701 (Ky.. 1952).
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exemption of a concern from "franchise" taxes did not immunize it
from license or occupation taxes imposed by a municipal corporation
for doing business within the community. 81 So, too, a chamber of com-
merce has been ruled not to be a charitable, scientific or educational
institution within the constitutional language and hence not exempt
from municipal taxation.82 The burden of proof is upon a party claim-
ing an exemption from municipal taxation to show clearly and un-
equivocally that he comes within the terms of the exemption.
83
However, it has been held with some validity that exemptions of
governmental properties from municipal taxation are not to be given
such a strict construction. 84 And Colorado has further ruled that its
exemption to schools is to be liberally construed.85 Although in gen-
eral strict construction is the rule, in practice it often amounts to a
"reasonable" construction. 86 Constitutional and statutory provisions
exempting property from state taxation at times are interpreted as
not extending the immunity to local taxes.
87
Not only have the states exempted properties and persons from local
taxation, but municipal corporations have themselves extended exemp-
tions. Often the practice is unconstitutional.8 For instance, under its
state constitutional provision requiring uniformity and equality, the
Tennessee court has ruled that municipal corporations could not
exempt farm lands.8 9 In a similar case negating power to exempt
industrial establishments, the same Court said:
"Exemptions from taxation are contrary to public policy and can only
be allowed when granted in clear and unmistakable terms. They are
not creatures of intendment or presumption. If the language in which
they are claimed to be granted) leaves it doubtful, the benefit of the
doubt must be given to the State, the life of which is taxes."9 0
In still other cases the grant of an exemption from taxes has been
ruled ultra vires. For instance, when in exchange for the use of a lot
for parking, a municipality conferred an exemption from all taxes
to the owner, the granted exemption was invalidated as ultra vires.9 1
81. Atlanta v. First Fed. S. & L. Ass'n, 209 Ga. 517, 74 S.E.2d 243 (1953).
82. Memphis C. of C. v. Memphis, 144 Tenn. 291, 232 S.W. 73 (1921).
83. Assessors of Framingham v. First Parish, 329 Mass. 212, 107 N.E.2d, 309
(1952).
84. Hanover Tp. v. Town of Morristown, 4 N.J. Super. 22, 66 A.2d 187 (1949).
85. Pitcher v. Miss Wolcott School, 63 Colo. 294, 165 Pac. 608 (1917).
86. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221
P.2d 31 (1950).
87. Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Steuben County, 264 App. Div. 945, 36 N.Y.S.2d
440 (1942).
88. Milo Water Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Milo, 133 Me. 4, 173 Atl. 152
(1934).
89. Bell v. Pulaski, 182 Tenn. 136, 184 S.W.2d 384 (1939); Sevierville v. King,
182 Tenn.. 143, 184 S.W.2d 381 (1945).
90. American Bemberg Corp. v. Elizabethton, 180 Tenn. 373, 175 S.W.2d 535,
537 (1943).
91. Whipple v. Teaneck Tp., 135 N.J.L. 345, 52 A.2d, 44 (1947).
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Constitutions in a few states, such as Mississippi, provide that the
state legislature shall by general laws provide for cities to aid and
encourage the establishment of industry by exempting such properties
from taxation 9 2 As noted earlier, many state constitutions spell out
what properties can be exempt from municipal taxation and the prob-
lem is frequently raised as to whether a particular immunization is
within the constitutionally permitted classes.93 When the state con-
stitution spells out the exemptions, it is generally exclusive and the
legislature cannot add others.94 This is directly decreed in the Arkan-
sas Constitution which reads: "All laws exempting property from
taxation other than as provided in this Constitution shall be void."
9 5
Where the state constitution is silent on the point, state statutes
ordinarily indicate what persons and properties can be exempted from
taxation by municipal corporations. As in the interpretation of
statutes granting exemptions, municipal ordinances conferring exemp-
tions from taxation will be strictly construed. 96 Exemptions from
municipal taxation are far larger than is customarily realized and
very frequently favoritism spells out injustice to the remaining
municipal taxpayers. In 1953 in Detroit, to illustrate the extent of ex-
emptions from local taxation, the exempted real property of benevolent,
charitable, educational, and religious institutions, as well as hospitals,
cemeteries, parsonages and veterans' memorial homes amounted to
$193,824,740. Furthermore, all personal property (of unknown
amount) of these organizations was exempt. Add to this the fact
that one hundred and six clubs were given exemptions up to 66 2/3%
of their assessments, amounting to a total withdrawal from tax rolls
of another $5,040,000. Clearly all the aforementioned groups receive
municipal benefits and protection and in almost any municipality
many similar organizations should be put back on the tax rolls. It
would be naive, however, not to realize that strong pressures exist
upon municipal legislators and assessors to keep off the tax rolls par-
ticular properties. Municipal authorities should at least explore con-
tractural agreements whereby the exempt institution realizes its
obligation to the community for protection afforded. One such agree-
ment reported in Ann Arbor, Michigan, returns to that city from the
state university located there payments of approximately a million
dollars over a ten year period.
Failure to tax for a number of years will not create against the
92. Miss. CONST., art. VII, § 193.
93. Byrd v. Larrimore, 212 S.C. 281, 47 S.E.2d 728 (1948) (holding such to
be for a "municipal" purpose within the state constitution).
94. Weller v. Phoenix, 39 Ariz. 148, 4 P.2d. 665 (1931); Tieman v. Indianapolis,
69 Ind. 375, 35 Am. Rep. 223 (1879); Daly Bank v. Board of Comm'rs, 33 Mont.
101, 81 Pac. 950 (1905).
95. ARK. CONST., art. XVI, § 6.
96. Spaulding v. City of Rutland, 110 Vt. 186, 3 A.2d 556 (1939).
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municipality an exemption from taxation.9 7 Legislatures can provide
that, although the tax day has passed, one who purchases property
from a tax-exempt organization for non-exempt purposes becomes at
once subject to the tax for the current year.98
Where property is immune from municipal taxation, one purchasing
it at a tax sale acquires no title.99
Inability to tax the property and functions of the Federal Government
and its instrumentalities
Without congressional consent neither the state nor its lesser politi-
cal subdivisions can tax the property of the Federal Government. So a
county was denied power under the Constitution to impose a property
tax upon machinery used by a private corporation but owned by the
United States.100 Similarly, the Massachusetts Court has ruled that a
city could not tax machinery belonging to the United States and leased
to a private corporation for the production of ordnance.1°1 Again, the
wartime taking over of piers by the Government immunized them
from local taxation. 02 In an interesting case where the Federal Gov-
ernment held legal title to land but the equitable title was in a private
party purchasing the land from the Government under contract, it was
ruled that a municipal corporation could tax the latter's interest in the
property. 0 3 And a New York court has decided that a municipal cor-
poration could tax the property of an enemy alien while legal title
was in the United States from 1942 to 1949, the court remarking that
it could find no claim of immunity from taxation while the property
was in the custody of the Alien Property Custodian. 10 4 While the re-
sult is quite proper, it is questionable that the immunity of federal
property hinges upon a claim of immunity.
Furthermore, it is quite clear that Congress can withdraw from
municipal taxation the property and functions of federal instrumen-
talities.105 In holding that the Congress could withdraw stock of na-
97. Powers v. Harvey, 103 A.2d 551 (RI. 1954).
98. Bronx Garment Center v. City of New York, 199 Misc. 513, 106 N.Y.S.2d
720 (1951).
99. Winn v. Little Rock, 165 Ark. 11, 262 S.W. 988 (1924).
100. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
101. Board of Assessors v. General Elec. Co., 330 Mass. 453, 115 N.E.2d 359
(1953).
102. United States v. Hoboken, 29 F.2d 932 (D.N.J. 1928). See also, Spring-
field v. United States, 99 F.2d 860 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 306 U.S. 650 (1938),
(municipal corporation cannot tax former post office site held for sale). Per-
sonalty owned by the United States is similarly exempt. East Orange v.
Joshua Hendy Iron Works, 134 N.J. 154, 46 A.2d 383 (1946).
103. S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946). To the same effect:
Bancroft Inv. Co. v. Jacksonville, 157 Fla. 546, 27 So. 2d 163 (1946). It had been
decided earlier that a city could tax the equitable interest of a purchaser in a
land contract from the United States Housing Corporation, a federal in-
strumentality. New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928).
104. Simonelli v. City of New York, 276 App. Div. 405, 95 N.Y.S.2d 316
(1950).
105. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (US. 1819).
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tional banks owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation from
local taxation, the United States Supreme Court observed-
"Congress has under the Constitution exclusive authority to determine
whether and to what extent its instrumentalities, such as the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, shall be immune from state tax-
ation." 106
Again, in sustaining congressional legislation exempting servicemen
from taxation in states where they are required to be by military
service, and in denying Denver power to tax the personal property of
an Air Force officer -under this statute, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
"The constitutionality of federal legislation exempting servicemen
from the substantial burdens of seriate taxation by the states in which
they may be required to be present by virtue of their service, cannot
be doubted."107
Indeed, even in the absence of congressional statutes of exemption, it
is usually indicated that the property and functions of federal in-
strumentalities are necessarily exempt from state and municipal
taxation.108
There are many congressional statutes conferring power upon states
and municipal corporations to tax the federal instrumentalities, and
their constitutionality is unquestioned. Under a typical statute munici-
pal corporations are permitted to tax the "real property" of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation and its subsidiaries, and the United
States Supreme Court has indicated that local law governs what is' to
be considered "realty."'10 9 Similarly, the real property of national
banks has been exposed to local taxation." 0 The sole problem under
such a statute is on6 of interpretation of the congressional grant- of
power to tax. By way of illustration, it has been ruled that authoriza-
tion to tax the realty of national banks does not permit a municipal
corporation to tax the franchise and intangible property of the in-
stitution."' Again, this grant did not justify a municipal corporation
106. Maricopa County v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 318 U.S. 357 (1943).
107. Dameror v. Brodhead-, 345 U.S. 322, 324 (1953).
108. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819). And cf. Indian
Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931). The implied immunity, of
a private concern serving as a federal instrumentality should only be so ex-
tensive as to prevent local taxes impeding the private concern in carrying out
its federal responsibilities.
109. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 606f(3), 610 (1948). Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corp., 25 Wash. 2d 652, 171 P.2d, 838 (1946)'; Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946); Borough of Homestead
v. Defense Plant Corp., 356 Pa. 500, 52 A.2d 581 (1947).
110. 12 U.S.C.A. § 548 (1945). Trabue Pittman Corp. v. Los Angeles County,
29 Cal. 2d 385, 175 P.2d 512 (1946).
111. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro; 173 U.S. 664 (1899).
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in imposing a discriminatory tax upon the real property of such a
bank." 2 The Federal Congress should, it is suggested, explore the
propriety and justice of exposing to municipal taxation all of the
property of private concerns serving for the moment as federal in-
strumentalities. The effect of removing from local tax rolls a sizable
industrial plant is considerable. For instance, it is reported that when
one plant was taken over by the Air Force in the City of Adrian,
Michigan, it removed $87,958 in taxes from the city, or nine percent of
its total budget." 3 Putting one factory in Detroit into the classification
of federal instrumentality took approximately ten million dollars
worth of machinery and inventory from the tax rolls of the city, in-
curring a tax loss of $390,000. The expenses of maintaining the mili-
tary establishment should not be concentrated upon particular munici-
pal corporations but should, it is urged, be spread over the national
taxpayers.
As early as 1829 it was decided that a municipal corporation could
not tax the ownership of United States securities held by a resident of
the city." 4 Again, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that a
municipality could not for tax purposes include in the assets of a local
bank securities of the United States held by the bank. 15 Furthermore,
the Court ruled that the income from bonds of the Federal Government
was also exempt from state and local taxation." 6 On the other hand, it
is now definitely established that municipal corporations can constitu-
tionally tax the income and earnings of federal employees so long as
they are residents of the community." 7
Inability to impose tonnage duties
The United States Constitution provides that "No state shall, without
the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage . ,,18 It is well
established that this is a prohibition upon municipal corporations and
other political subdivisions of the states." 9
This prohibition prevents states, cities, port authorities and the like
from charging duties upon vessels coming in from other ports without
having rendered services to the vessels.120 Thus, in 1874 the United
States Supreme Court invalidated New Orleans' charge of ten cents
per ton on steamboats. Whatever, said the Court, "which is ... in its
112. First Nat'l Bank of Hartford v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927).
113. It is similarly reported, that taking off the tax roll one aircraft plant
meant an annual tax loss of $60,840 to Southington, Connecticut, a town of
6,000.
114. Weston v. City Council, 2 Pet. 449 (U.S. 1829).
115. Home Say. Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U.S. 503 (1907).
116. Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927).
117. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). See also Howard v. Louisville,
344 U.S. 624 (1953).
118. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
119. Southern SS. Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31 (U.S. 1867).
120. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204 (U.S. 1871).
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essence a contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving and depart-,
ing from a port of the United States, is within the prohibition."'' 1
Again, in 1877 the same court invalidated a fee for entering the port
of New York, the Court noting that "the charge is not exacted for any
services rendered or offered to be rendered."'m And, if the fee or duty
imposed by a municipal corporation is for the privilege of entering the
port it is invalid even though not measured by tonnage. As early as
1867 the United States Supreme Court voided such a charge, explain-
ing that the Constitutional provision banned "any duty on a ship." "It
was not only a pro rata tax which was prohibited," said the Court,
"but any duty on the ship, whether a fixed sum upon its whole tonnage
or a sum to be ascertained by comparing the amount of tonnage with
the rate of duty."'
In the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia24 the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1851 that a
pilotage fee, not in fact amounting to a privilege charge for entrance
into the port, did not violate the constitutional prohibition on tonnage
duties. The Supreme Court has since made it clear in a number -of
decisions that a municipal corporation can charge for wharfage pro-
vided to vessels without violating the clause. 2 5 More recently the
Court has indicated that if the municipal levy is but reasonable recom-
pense for any services rendered it does not violate the ban on tonnage
duties, even though the fee is measured by tonnage. The constitutional
prohibition, said the Court, "does not extend to charges made by state
authority, even though graduated according to tonnage, for services
rendered to and enjoyed by the vessel, such as pilotage, or wharfage, or
charges for the use of locks on a navigable river, or fees for medical
inspection."12
6
The United States Supreme Court has held since 1878 that a munici-
pal corporation, without violating this clause, can tax as personal
property boats used in interstate commerce on a river so long as the
city was the home port and principal office of the owner.u7 A recent
ruling of the Court indicates that such a municipal corporation will
likely be limited to an apportioned tax if the vessel is subject to
taxation by other jurisdictions. 28 It is indeed debatable whether the
mere threat of taxation in the remote future should require that the
home port be limited to an apportioned tax.
121. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 (U.S. 1874).
122. Inman SS. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 225 (1877).
123. Southern SS. Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31 (U.S. 1867).
124. 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851).
125. Parkersburg & Ohio River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691
(1882); Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1887).
126. Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex tel. Docks Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261,
266 (1935).
127. Wheeling Transp. v. Co. v. City of Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273 (1878).
128. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
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Inab:lit/y to tax imports and exports
-The, so-called import-export clause of the United States Constitution
reads:. .'No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any
impost5 or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net produce of all
duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be.
for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall
be'subject to the revision and control of the Congress. 129 The necessity
for the clause is ably conveyed by the footnoted utterances of Hamilton
and. Justice Miller.130 This clause, it has always been recognized, is a
limitation upon municipal tax power.
After the United States Supreme Court had established that the
original package doctrine protected both the goods and the importer
from state taxation,'3 ' the Court in 1872 ruled that a city could not
impose an ad valorem personal property tax upon champagne imported
from a foreign country and still in the original cases, unbroken and
unsQld, in the hands of the importer. Said the Court:
'The goods imported .do not lose their character as imports, and
become incorporated into the mass of property of the state, until
they have passed from the control of the importer or been broken up
• him from their original cases. Whilst retaining their character as
imports, a tax upon them in any shape, is within the constitutional
limitation."132
The immunity of property imported from abroad and still in the
original package has been recognized in many cases.
133
The "original package" is the principal container used for shipping
goods into this country. When this protective container is broken, the
goods become taxable. In a leading case the Supreme Court indicated
129: "U. CONST., art.'I, § 10, cl. 2.
130. "The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others
tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted
to'by'the tributary States. The relative situation of New York, Connecticut, and
New, Jersey, would afford an example of this kind. New York, from the
necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great part
of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the
capacity. of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be willing
nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not consent that a duty
p iAl byThem should be remitted in favor of the citizens of her neighbors; nor
would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the way, to dis-
tinguish the customers in her own markets. Would Connecticut and- New
Jersey long submit to be taxed by. New York for her exclusive benefit? Should
we be long permitted to retain the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a
metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so odious to
our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to pre-
serve it against the incumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the
co-operating pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that
temerity alone will answer in the affirmative." THE FEDERALIST, No. 7. See
also.: Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566. (187,8).
131. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U.S. 1827).
132. Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29 .(U.S. 1872).
133. Detroit v. Lake Superior Paper Co., 202 Mich. 22, 167 N.W. 852 (1918).
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that "when the box or case was opened for the sale or delivery bf the
separate parcels contained in it, each parcel of the goods lost its 'dstinc-
tive character as an import and became property subject to taxation
by "the state as other like property situated within its limits.' 1 4 The
principles can be stated more generally to the effect that whenever
imported goods can be said to be incorporated into the general mass of
property within the municipality'it becomes subject to local taati6ri.
Such incorporation or commingling is found by a sale in this bOiltry
to one who was not the importer. So, Mobile Was sustained in imb.girg
a tax equal to one-half of one percent 6f gross sales, as applied'to'a
merchant who purchased from importers goods in the original a5ick-
ages and who re-sold the goods. "It is' settled... ," said the Supreme
Court, "that merchandise in the original packages once sold by 'he
importer is taxable as other property."
135
Although there have been temporary deviations from 'the Viev,
it can be accepted as thoroughly established that the original jMk-
age doctrine is no limitation upon municipal taxation of g6ods
'brought in from sister states, the term "import" in the ingtait
clause having reference only to goods entering from foreign 1diih-
tries.1
36
Not only are municipal corporations prohibited from imposing
imports or duties-upon inipits, but the ban extends as *ell o ex-
ports. The basic principle here is that for the protective cloak of
the clause to avail in the case of exports the goods must have begun
moving into foreign commerce and nothing short of this will im-
munize the .goods from local. taxation. The United States Suprerie
Court has, by way of illustration, sustained a California county in
.imposing a personal property tax upon a dismantled cement plant.in-
tended for export but not yet in the stream of export. Notwith-
standing the fact that part of. the plant had actually been shipped,
the balance was subject to the local tax. Said the Supreme Court:
"It is the entrance of the articles into the export stream that marks
the start of the process of exportation. Then there is certainty, that the
goods 'ae headed for their foreign destination, and. will hot be divdiAiT
to domestic use. Nothing less will suffice." 137
Similary, the Court has upheld a Michigan city in imposing an ad
valorem property tax on gasoline stored there for fifteen months,
even though clearly intended for export and actually exported :at a
later date. Indicating that even a certain probability of exp6Yt in
the future will not immunize the goods from local taxation;,...he
Supreme Court reniarked: "
134. May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900).
13'5. Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. 110 (U.S. 1869).
136. Wood-ruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U.S. 1869). "
137. Empresa Sid'rurgica v. Countr of Merced, 337 U.S. 154 (949).
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"Petitioner's intent to export the gasoline and the fact that the gaso-
line was eventually exported are not enough, by themselves, to confer
immunity from local taxation. . . .The Export-Import Clause was
meant to confer immunity from local taxation upon property being
exported, not to relieve property eventually to be exported from
its share of the cost of local services.
1 38
The present rule is sound in making such goods participate in pay-
ing for local protection received, and conferring immunity at any
earlier step would too readily make it possible for the diversion
of goods into the domestic market after having been exempted from
state and local taxes.
It seems quite clear that municipal taxes, measured by gross re-
ceipts or otherwise, upon individuals or concerns engaged solely in
importing139 or exporting' 40 would violate this clause, as well as
the Commerce Clause. Offensive to the same constitutional clauses
would be a local tax on the amount of sales of imported goods in
the original packages made by either the importer or an auctioneer
acting for him. Apropos of the latter situation, the United States
Supreme Court has said:
"The tax on sales made by an auctioneer is a tax on the goods sold...
and when applied to foreign goods sold in the original packages of
the importer, before they have become incorporated into the general
property of the country, the law imposing such tax is void as laying
a duty on imports."141
Taxation of property in interstate and foreign commerce
As a result of the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution, municipal corporations can not tax goods or property moving
in interstate or foreign commerce. 142 However, property is not im-
mune from municipal taxation simply because at a later date it will
probably move into interstate commerce.143 And preliminary move-
ments to prepare the goods or articles for interstate commerce are not
themselves a part of interstate commerce for this purpose.
144 So, even
though there had been some movement of logs, a village was per-
mitted by the United States to tax the logs when they were in the
waters of the village for a considerable period of time before being
138. Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 337 U.S. 286 (1949).
139. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933).
140. Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917). See also, as
applicable to both imports and exports: Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937) (Stevedore); Martin Ship Service Co. v. Los
Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 793, 215 P.2d 24 (1949) (concern rendering repair services
only to ships engaged in foreign and interstate commerce.)
141. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 573 (1878).
142. Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922).
143. Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
144. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
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sent on to the mill as needed.145 So, too, where logs had been cut
and put into a stream and upon the banks of the stream within a
municipality, the corporation could tax the logs even though later
the logs were all to go into a larger stream and interstate commerce.
Reasoned the Supreme Court:
"Until actually launched on its way to another state, or committed
to a common carrier for transportation to such state, its destination
is not fixed and certain. It may be sold or otherwise disposed of within
the state .... "146
Even though goods moving in interstate commerce have paused
within a municipal corporation or state, if the delay is solely to
protect the goods from the perils or vicissitudes of the journey, a
municipal corporation cannot tax the goods during such a pause
within its limits. For instance, when logs were detained because of
high water, the Commerce Clause immunized the logs from local
taxation. Said Chief Justice Taft:
"The interstate commerce clause of the Constitution does not give im-
munity to movable property from local taxation which is not dis-
criminative, unless it is in actual continuous transit in interstate
commerce. When it is shipped by a common carrier from one state
to another in the course of such an uninterrupted, journey it is
clearly immune. The doubt arises when there are interruptions
in the journey and when the property in its transportation is under
the complete control of the owner during the passage. If the inter-
ruptions are only to promote the safe or convenient transit, then
the continuity of the interstate trip is not broken."147
So, too, when oil was brought into a state and held in storage awaiting
ships or the accumulation of enough oil to load a ship, the oil was
held immune from local property taxation on the ground that the
storage was incidental to the transit of the oil through the state.
148
Similarly, the California Supreme Court has exempted from local
taxation goods going through that state for Hawaii but held up
during the war for lack of ships.149
When goods have paused for a discernible break and are being
kept within a municipal corporation for the economic advantage of
the owner they can be taxed by the municipality giving protection,
even though they will surely resume their interstate journey at a
subsequent date. So, in 1913, the Supreme Court ruled that the City
of South Amboy could tax coal stored there even though it came
145. Diamond Match Co. v. Village of Ontonagon, 188 U.S. 82 (1903).
146. Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
147. Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922).
148. Carson Petrol. Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1928).
149. Von Hamm-Young Co. v. City & County. of San Francisco, 29 Cal. 2d
798, 178 P.2d 748 (1947).
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from another state and was destined for other states upon the re-
ceipt of orders. The Supreme Court recognized that the coal received
the protection of the local community and emphasized that the delay
was occasioned for a business purpose and advantage. 150 The same
year, the Supreme Court sustained the power of an Illinois county
to tax grain there for sorting, grading and the like, notwithstanding
the .grain came from other states and was destined for still others,
and even though the delay within the county was for but a short
period. The Court indicated that the grain could be disposed of
within the county and that so long as this was a distinct possibility
the local community could tax.151 More recently, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a license tax of a New Jersey township im-
posed upon a company storing coal and keeping it within the town-
ship until ordered out by the owner. The Court was influenced by
the fact that "the duration of the cessation of transit is indefinite,"
and again it emphasized that "at the time the tax is laid it cannot
be determined what the ultimate destination or use of the property
may be." The earlier authorities indicated above involving property
taxes apply, according to the Court, "equally to franchise or other
taxes upon the business of furnishing the storage facilities."'15 2
Even though goods have come into a municipal corporation from
interstate coinmerce, if the interstate transit has come to an end
and the property has become part of the common mass of goods within
the municipality, it is clear that the municipal corporation under
delegated powers can impose property taxes, non-discriminatory in
their operation, upon the goods.153 This is so, too, even though the
goods are still in their original packages in which they were brought
in from other states. 54
Taxation of carriers used to move interstate and foreign commerce
For a long time it has been accepted that a municipal corporation
can tax a seagoing vessel if the owner of the vessel is domiciled
within the municipality. 155 The same rule has regularly been applied
to vessels engaged in commerce between the different states and used
on inland waters. For instance, in 1879 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the City of Wheeling could impose a property tax on
150. Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy 228 U.S. 665 (1913).
151. Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504 (1913).
152. Independent Warehouses v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947).
153. Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169, 175 (1935); Cudahy Packing
Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450, 453 (1918); Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky,
217 U.S. 563, 575 (1910); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937).
154. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506 (1923).; Henneford. v. Silas
Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192
U.S. 500, 519 (1904); Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U.S. 1869).
155. Hays v. Pacific Mail SS. Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1855); Morgan v.
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vessels plying between different ports on the Ohio River when Wheel-
ing was the home port and home office, and it was not determinative
that the boats were enrolled as coasting vessels under the laws of
the United States. 156 Until 1952 the only exception was that where
vessels had acquired a situs for taxation in some other jurisdiction,
the municipal corporation or state in which the owner resided could
not tax,157 but the situs could.15 8 In that year the Supreme Court an-
nounced that a state, and ipso facto a municipal corporation, which
was the domicile of the owner of a vessel, the home port and place
of registration, could impose only an apportioned property tax if the
vessel was subject to taxation in non-domiciliary jurisdictions. The
Court indicated its disfavor to multiple taxation in this kind of a
situation and stated that An unapportioned tax by the domicile
"would have no relation to the opportunities, benefits, or protection
which the taxing state gives those operations." 59 This case involved
taxation of vessels used in inland waterways and is not to be deemed
controlling with respect to domiciliary taxation of vessels used on
the high seas.
In 1871 the Supreme Court would not permit St. Louis to levy a
property tax on boats enrolled there but laid up in Illinois which
was the home port and which levied a tax on the boats.160 And in 1906
the Court would not permit Kentucky to tax a vessel enrolled at
Paducah and plying inland waters but owned by a foreign. corpora-
tion. 161 More recently, however, the Court has ruled that states and
presumably municipal corporations can levy property taxes upon boats
owned by non-domiciliaries and used on inland waters within the
local jurisdiction so long as a reasonable apportionment formula was
used.162 The power of a non-domiciliary jurisdiction to tax vessels
used on the high seas on an apportioned formula is not yet established.
In 1855 the United States Supreme Court held that though a vessel
regularly docked in California and was repaired there, the vessel,
owned by a New York corporation, could not be taxed by California. 63
And in 1873 even though a vessel was enrolled at the Port of Mobile
and stopped there tri-weekly and was there on tax day, the Supreme
Court ruled that it was not there subject to tax so long as owned by a
New York corporation, and this even though there was no proof that
New York taxed the vessel.
164
156. Wheeling, Parkersburg an& Cincinnati Transp. Co. v. City of Wheeling,
99 U.S. 276 (1879).
157. Old Dominion SS. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
158. Old Dominion SS. Co. v. Virginia, supra note 157; Ayer & Lord Tie Co.
v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906).
159. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
160. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U.S. 1871).
161. Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906).
162. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Lines, 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
163. Hays v. Pacific Mail SS. Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1855).
164. Morgan v. Parham,. 16 Wall.-471 (U.S. 1873).
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In these Cases there was no appointment and, in line with the
tendency to uphold local taxation when the community has given
a quid pro quo, the Ott decision may well presage the constitutionality
of a local tax upon ocean-going vessels owned outside the state so
long as a reasonable apportionment formula can be devised and
utilized.
States, and presumably municipal corporations under delegated
power, can when they are the domiciles of railroads tax all of the
rolling stock of the railroad where it is not shown by the carrier
that any specific cars or any average of cars was so continuously
in another state as to be taxable there.165 Where property of such a
carrier has acquired situs in another jurisdiction, the domicile can
no longer subject it to tax.166 Non-domiciliary states and their muni-
cipalities can tax the rolling stock of railroads by any reasonable ap-
portioned formula. 16
7
It is well settled that the Commerce Clause does not prevent
municipal corporations from taxing property used by highway car-
riers in interstate commerce, so long as the local charge levied is but
reasonable compensation for the use of the roads.168 State courts have
indicated that mileage and weight formulae are proper,16 9 and so, too,
in the case of personnel carriers, seating capacity. 7 0 Recently, the
Supreme Court has indicated that almost any formula used by local
authorities will be constitutional so long as the amount actually
levied is a fair charge for the use of the municipal streets.'7 ' Where
the local charge is an unreasonable fee for the use of the roads the
Supreme Court will readily invalidate the local exaction.17 2
Analogies drawn from the railroad and vessel cases can be applied
to the properties of airlines used in interstate commerce. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a domiciliary state which was
also the home port could tax all of the property of the airline so long
as "a defined part of the domicile corpus" has not acquired a situs in
another state and so long as no other jurisdiction could impope an
apportioned tax-n 3 A non-domiciliary state, and by inference an
authorized municipal corporation in such state, which provides pro-
tection to an airline and its property, can levy upon such property
165. New York. Cent. R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
166. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 195 (1905).
167. Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
168. Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931); Hicklin v. Coney,
290 U.S. 169 (1933); Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936); Huston v. Des
Moines, 176 Iowa 455, 156 N.W. 883 (1916); Ex parte Parr, 82 Tex. Crim. R.
525, 200 S.W. 404 (1918).
169. Brooks Transp. Co. v. Lynchburg, 185 Va. 135, 37 S.E.2d 857 (1946).
170. Northern Kentucky Transp. Co. v. Bellevue, 215 Ky. 514, 285 S.W. 241
(1926); Jefferson Transp. Co. v. St. Cloud, 155 Minn. 463, 193 N.W. 960 (1923).
171. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1949). 
"
172. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928). See also: Clark v. Poor,
274 U.S. 554 (1927); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928).
173. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
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a reasonably apportioned tax, and this, too, even though the airline's
home port is elsewhere.174
Municipal Sales and Use Taxes
Even though the goods have come into a municipal corporation
through the channels of interstate commerce, the municipal corpora-
tion can impose a sales tax upon the transfer of the goods within the
municipality. As far back as 1869 the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the City of Mobile could tax the sales of merchandise in the
original package when the goods were brought in, not from foreign
countries, but from sister states. 7 5 Then, in 1940, the same court
sustained New York City's sales tax as applied to coal coming in
from Pennsylvania, where the sales contract had been entered into
in New York City by a Pennsylvania corporation having a sales office
in the City, and title having passed in New York City.1? 6 At the
same time, the Supreme Court upheld the same sales tax in ap-
plication to a sale of machines delivered to a New York City buyer
by a sales office in New York City Whose salesmen secured the order,
even though the order was sent to Illinois for approval and the
machines came into New York from there, and even though the re-
mittances were made by the purchaser directly to the Illinois office.
177
In another United States Supreme Court decision involving the
same tax, it was held constitutional in its application to sales to a
New York City buyer even though the goods were shipped direct
to such purchaser from out-of-state, and even though the order was
accepted in Massachusetts, the Court once more noting the presence
of a sales agent in New York City. 78 Again, the Supreme Court has
sustained New York's tax in application to sales in the City by an
oil company to a foreign owner of vessels plying between New York
and France, which owner had- an office in New York, when the oil
was moved from New Jersey tanks to the vessels within New York
City.179 Furthermore, by per curiam decisions the Supreme Court
has affirmed decisions of New York's highest court ruling constitu-
tional the New York City sales tax in application to orders (a)
received by telephone in a New York office, phoned for approval
to New Jersey and filled from New Jersey by delivery to the
buyer in New York City; (b) received by telephone in New Jersey
and filled by delivery to a customer in New York City; and (c) in
writing sent by a New York purchaser to New Jersey and delivery
174. Braniff Airways v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
175. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U.S. 1869.)
176. McGoldrick v. Berwind White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
177. McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940).
178. McGoldrick v. DuGrenier, 309 U.S. 70 (1940).




made from a New Jersey yard to customers in New York. 180 The
action of both courts emphasizes the importance to be attached to
delivery within the taxing municipality.
The case of McLeod v. Dilworth,18 ' however, indicates care is"necessary so that local as well as state sales taxes are not applied
to transactions where title passes outside the locality and where by
the terms of the contract delivery to a common carrier outside the
taxing jurisdiction fulfills the seller's obligations. There, even though
ultimate "delivery" was within the taxing jurisdiction, the Court
invalidated the local sales tax when applied to a foreign corporation
having no sales office in the state, sales being secured by solicitation
"within the state but subject to home office approval, title thus passing
outside the state, and collections being made outside the state.
Municipal corporations can constitutionally reach goods coming
into the community under the circumstances of the McLeod case
by imposing a use tax upon the goods, for it is clear that a local use
tax can be applied to goods used within a municipality even though
at some earlier time they moved in interstate commerce.182 And it is
no barrier to the constitutionality of a use tax imposed by a mu-
nicipal corporation that the goods were subject to property taxes in
some other state before they moved into interstate commerce, or sub-
ject to a sales tax by some other state for an earlier transfer there.183
A state, and by analogy an authorized municipal corporation, can
require out-of-state sellers to collect their local sales and use taxes
for them under certain circumstances. Recently, the United States
Supreme Court would not permit Maryland to force collection of
its use tax from a Delaware store that delivered into the state goods
purchased by Maryland residents in Delaware. 84 This decision to
the author is questionable for if the store could deliver the goods
throughout Maryland in its own trucks it seems neither unfair nor
unreasonable to make it account to Maryland for that State's use
tax, considering further that Maryland compensated the store for
its efforts. The four dissenters quite properly felt the case is within
the principle governing earlier cases sustaining collection procedures
upon out-of-state sellers having sufficient contacts within the state
to make it fair and reasonable that they collect the sales or use tax.
In 1944 the Supreme Court had upheld the State of Iowa in forcing
a Minnesota concern that delivered goods to Iowa purchasers to
180. Jagels v. Taylor, 280 N.Y. 766, 21 N.E.2d, 526 (1939); 281 N.Y. 664, 22
N.E.2d 487, af'd per curiam, 309 U.S. 619 (1940).
181. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
182. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); Felt & Tarrant Co.
v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
183. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher,'306 U.S. 167 (199).
184. Miller Brbs. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.' 340 (1954); 8 'VAND. L. Rv, 124
(1954).
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collect the Iowa use tax.185 Here the orders were secured by solicitors
sent into Iowa, and: the majority of the: Court in the Miller case
seemed to think there was a constitutional difference in how the
orders were secured. It should be noted that in the General Trading
case the orders were not delivered by the vendor's vehicles, which
was frequently the case in the Miller situation, but by the lesser
contacts of parcel post and common carriers. The manner of solicita-
tion simply should-not be controlling as to the adequacy of con-
tacts. This is illustrated by a 1941 decision of the Supreme Court
where solicitation within the taxing jurisdiction was only by mail
and yet, from the existence of retail stores within the state, adequate
contacts were found to justify compulsory collection by the out-
of-state concern.186 In a companion case at that time the Court very
aptly remarked: "The fact that solicitation was done through local
advertisements rather than by local agents . . . is immaterial.' 1 87
The constitutionality of occupation, privilege, license taxes and the like
The privilege of engaging in interstate commerce is granted by
no state or municipal corporation, hence no municipality can impose
any tax, however denominated, for the privilege of doing within it
such business. For instance, in 1890 San Francisco's license tax was
held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court whent
applied to an agent 6f a railroad whose task it was to stimulate busi-
ness for the interstate carrier. 188 Again, the Supreme Court has in-
validated under the commerce clause the application of a local priv-
ilege tax applicable to all trade, business or commercial actility,
within the city when it was imposed upon a stevedoring company serv-
ing only interstate and foreign commerce.189 And similarly the Court
ruled that the Port of Mobile could not impose a tax upon the business
of sending and receiving telegraph messages.' Said the Court:
"No state has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in. any
-orm, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the
subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that
transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, and
the reason is that such taxation is a burden on that commerce. .. "190
185. General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
186. Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
187. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
188. McColl v. California, 136 U.S. 104 (1890).
189. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
190. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 641 (1888). So, also, in 1914 the Court
invalidated New York City's ordinance imposing a license fee of five dollars
per express wagon as applied to wagons of the Adams Express Co. whose busi-
ness in New York City was 98% in interstate commerce. Said the Court: "Local
police regulations cannot go so far as to deny, the right to engage in interstate
commerce, or to treat it as a local privilege and prohibit its exercise in the




Because very often the flow of goods in interstate commerce is
begun by solicitors, their work is deemed an essential part of that
commerce and municipal taxes upon such solicitors for out-of-state
concerns shipping goods into the community in response to orders
secured there are regularly invalidated. In 1887 the United States
Supreme Court annulled a tax upon a solicitor or drummer for an out-
of-state concern in the amount of ten dollars per week or twenty-
five per month.' 91  Again, in 1925 the Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional under the commerce clause another municipal ordi-
nance imposing a license fee of twelve and a half dollars per quarter
upon each solicitor taking orders for goods for future delivery and re-
ceiving payment or deposit in advance, and imposing a charge of
twenty-five dollars per quarter if a vehicle was used.192 It was
immaterial, according to the Court, that the solicitors were paid
through retention of the advance payments. Said the Court in con-
clusion: "The ordinance materially burdens interstate commerce and
conflicts with the commerce clause." More recently the same court
invalidated another municipal imposition upon solicitors in the amount
of fifty dollars per year plus one-half of one percent of the gross
earnings in excess of one thousand dollars for the preceding year.193
In most of these cases the Supreme Court has expressed its fears
that such taxes were used or could readily be used to discriminate
against persons in interstate commerce in favor of local merchants,
and the Court further indicated its apprehension that the cumulative
burden of many of these municipal taxes would spell the end of in-
terstate commerce. Under the mandate of the United States Constitu-
tion state courts have rather regularly joined in striking down local
taxes imposed upon solicitors for out-of-state concerns. 194
There are other instances in which municipal levies upon the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce have been set aside by
the courts. Thus, when South Bend levied a license tax of fifty dol-
lars per year upon buses carring twelve or more persons, which the
Indiana Supreme Court assumed could be applied to buses engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the municipal tax. Said the Court: "The privilege of
engaging in such commerce is one which a state cannot deny. A state
is equally inhibited from conditioning its exercise on the payment
of an occupation tax.' 195 Once again, a New Orleans license tax on
firms running boats into the Gulf of Mexico was set aside.196 So, too,
191. Robbins v. Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
192. Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925).
193. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
194. Best & Co. v. Omaha, 149 Neb. 868, 33 N.W.2d 150 (1948); 35 VA. L. REv.
114 (1949).
195. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928).
196. Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69 (1884).
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a Chicago license fee upon tugboats used in interstate commerce,
the Supreme Court noting in this case that "The license fee is a tax
for the use of navigable waters, not a charge by way of compensation
for any specific improvement.'
u97
Where a concern engaged in interstate commerce is also engaged
within a municipal corporation in local or intrastate activity the
firm can be taxed by the municipality for the privilege of doing the
local business. To illustrate, in the leading case the United States
Supreme Court sustained a Saint Louis tax imposed as a condition of
the grant of a license to carry on a manufacturing business in the
city, the amount of the tax being ascertained by the amount of the
sales of manufactured goods, including the goods sold out of the state
and in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reflected that the
city could have measured the tax by a percentage of the value of all
goods as manufactured, and that the computation used in effect post-
poned the tax until the goods were sold and thus benefitted the tax-
payer. The Supreme Court stated:
"In our opinion, the operation and effect of the taxing ordinance are
to impose a legitimate burden upon the business of carrying on the
manufacture of goods in the cityn; it produces no direct burden on
commerce in the goods manufactured., whether domestic or interstate,
and only the same kind of incidental and indirect effect as that
which results from the payment of property taxes or any other and
general contribution to the cost of government. Therefore, it does
not amount to a regulation of interstate commerce."1 98
Even though goods have come into a municipal corporation from
the channels of interstate commerce, the peddling of the goods within
the city is deemed a local activity after commerce has ended, and
municipalities can tax the peddling of such goods.199 There is a much
closer case when municipal corporations tax the delivery of goods sent
into the community from interstate commerce, but there is reason to
believe such taxes are constitutional when the delivery is a separate
incident removed in essence from the interstate commerce or where
the amount of the tax is not a great burden upon the commerce. In
this situation the absence of a possibility of multiple burdens may
well influence the United States Supreme Court to sustain such a levy.
In sustaining a tax of two dollars a day, ten dollars a week or twenty-
five dollars a year for the deliverers of fuel oil in an Alabama town
even as applied to a Florida concern delivering into the municipality,
the Alabama Supreme Court has explained:
197. Harmon v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893).
198. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). See, further, Ingalls
Iron Works v. Birmingham, 248 Ala. 417, 27 So. 2d 788 (1946).
199. Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919). See, further, Erwin v.
Omaha, 118 Neb. 331, 224 N.W. 692 (1929).
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"The taxing power of a state is not to be regarded as having been
exercised, in an unconstitutional manner where the levy is not dis-
criminatory by character, does not materially impede the commerce,
and is not subject to local levy in some other sovereignty."200
In a related situation the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit has upheld New York City's privilege tax when imposed
upon a railroad and as it included in the gross income subject to tax
demurrage charges imposed upon the shippers who delayed in picking
up the goods after the interstate transit had ended.201
Even though a transaction seen as a whole may be deemed inter-
state commerce, there may be certain "intrastate events" or "local
activities" in connection therewith that justify the imposition of
municipal taxes. As early as 1892 the United States Supreme Court up-
held a county in imposing a license tax upon the general business of
brokers, remarking: "the fact that the business done chances to con-
sist, for the time being, wholly or partially, in negotiating sales be-
tween resident and non-resident merchants of goods situated in
another state, does not necessarily involve the taxation of inter-
state commerce, forbidden by the Constitution."202 The tax was
measured by a percentage of the gross annual commissions received,
but the Court did not consider this constitutionally objectionable. Said
the tribunal: ". . . it is difficult to see why a citizen doing a gen-
eral business at the place of his domicile should escape payment of
his share of the burdens of municipal government because the amount
is arrived at by reference to his profits. This tax is not on the goods,
nor is it a tax on non-resident merchants; and if it can be said to
affect interstate commerce in: any way it is incidentally, and so
remotely as not to amount to a regulation of such commerce."203
Comparably, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Pitts-
burgh can apply its mercantile license tax and include in its gross re-
ceipts used as the measure of tax, sales there to buyers there even
though delivery was made out of the state.20 4 Similarly, though photo-
graphs were sent out of the state for development, and after approval
of proofs the photos were sent in from out of the state, the Mississippi
Supreme Court sustained a municipal privilege tax on persons engaged
in photography, pointing out that the tax was solely on the local
privilege of taking the picture.205 Also in point are the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in sustaining local license taxes
upon the privilege of interstate telegraph companies in doing local
200. Sanford v. City, of Clanton, 31 Ala. App. 253, 15 So. 2d 303, 307, cert.
denied, 244 Ala. 671, 15 So. 2d 309 (1943). See, also, City of Enterprise v.
Fleming, 240 Ala. 460, 199 So. 691 (1940).
201. In re New York, 0. & W. Ry., 161 FR2d 518 (2d Cir. 1947).
202.. Ficklen. v. Taxing Dist., 145 U.S. 1, 21 (1891).
203. Id. at 24.
204. Keystone Metal Co. v. Pittsburgh, 374 Pa. 323, 97, A.2d 797 (1953).
205. Craig v. Mills, 203 Miss. 692, 33 So. 8d 801 (1948).
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business and in maintaining poles throughout the city. A state or
municipal corporation, announced the Supreme Court, in approving
Richmond's annual license tax of two dollars per pole: "may lawfully
impose a license tax restricted . . . to the right to do local business
within its borders where such tax does not burden, or discrim-
inate against, interstate business and where the local business pur-
porting to be taxed ... is so substantial in amount that it does not
clearly appear that the tax is a disguised attempt to tax interstate
commerce." The Court added:
"Even, if the net returns from the intrastate business should not equal
such tax and it must be paid from interstate earnings, this alone would
not be conclusive against its validity. If the method of doing interstate
business necessarily imposes duties and liabilities upon a municipality,
it may not be charged with the cost of these without just compensa-
tion. Even interstate business must pay its way. .... -206
If any local business is done by interstate carriers they can be
subjected therefor to municipal occupation, privilege and license
taxes. In 1883 the Supreme Court held that the levying of a license
fee upon keepers of ferries was constitutional in its application to
one who used the ferries in interstate commerce but who kept them
in the taxing jurisdiction. Imposition of a license tax such as this
by the situs "is not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of
the Constitution of the United States," according to the Court.
20 7
Recently the same court has sustained a Chicago annual license tax
imposed upon persons operating carts and trucks in the city, even as
applied to an Illinois corporation having its principal place of busi-
ness in the city and transporting goods in interstate, as well as in
intrastate, commerce. Considerable significance was attached by
some members of the Court to the fact that Chicago was the "home
port" of the truck line.20 8 The conditions under which municipal
corporations can impose license and occupation taxes and the like
upon concerns engaged in both local and interstate business were
enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1928. Said the Court at that time:
206. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919). The
same year the Court could say it was "well settled" "that a reasonable tax upon
the maintenance of poles and wires erected, and maintained by a telegraph
company within the limits of a city. pursuant to authority granted by its ordi-
nances is not an unwarranted burden upon interstate or foreign commerce."
Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919).
207. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365 (1883).
208. Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953). See further: American
Transit Co. v. Philadelphia, 28 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1928) (sustaining a license
fee of fifty dollars per bus on the operators of such buses); Southern Fruit
Co. v. Porter, 188 S.C. 422, 199 S.E. 537 (1938) (indicating that there could be
no license fee upon concerns from out of state taking orders and delivering
within a municipality by trucks unless the charge was clearly apportioned. to
the use of the streets).
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"But in order that the fee or tax shall be valid, it must appear that
it is imposed solely on account of the intrastate business; that the
amount exacted is not increased because of the interstate business
done; that one engaged in interstate commerce would not be subject to
the imposition; and that the person could discontinue the intrastate
business without withdrawing also from the interstate business."209
Income and receipt taxes; taxes discriminatory against persons or
products of interstate commerce.
It seems well established at this writing that municipal corporations
cannot tax the gross receipts of concerns engaged therein exclusively
in interstate commerce. For this reason municipal levies upon the
gross receipts of stevedoring concerns 210 and interstate carriers211
have been invalidated.
However, following the hint offered by the United States Supreme
Court in Central Greyhound Lines v. Meader, 212 the City of New York
amended its business receipts tax so as to get at the percentage of
receipts from tickets sold by carriers in interstate commerce that
might be deemed properly attributable to New York City business.
The city apportioned the receipts on the basis of mileage, wages and
salaries paid in the city, and income from tickets sold in the city.
As so apportioned, even though the taxpayer is engaged solely in
interstate commerce, the New York City tax has been sustained by
the state courts. Said the court of first instance: "The plaintiff main-
tains a terminal and transacts business within the City of New York.
The said business, including maintenance of the terminal, may be,
and no doubt is, interstate commerce. Nevertheless, it is interstate
commerce to which the city bears a special relation. Under such
circumstances, a tax is not repugnant to the commerce clause unless
it constitutes a burden on interstate commerce. If the tax is fairly
apportioned, the commerce clause is satisfied."213
If the taxpayer does both an interstate and a local business within
the municipality, it can be subjected to a gross receipts tax upon
the severable and distinct local business. 214 Since a state can,
under the commerce clause, tax the net income of a concern engaged
therein in an exclusively interstate commerce, presumably the same
tax can be levied by an authorized municipal corporation.215
209. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 171 (1928).
210. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
211. Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); All American
Bus Lines v. New York, 268 App. Div. 508, 52 N.Y.S.2d, 689, aff'd, 296 N.Y. 571,.
68 N.E.2d 869 (1944).
212. 354 U.S. 653 (1948).
213. M & M Transportation Co. v. New York, 84 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130, af'd,
275 App. Div. 1027, 91 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1948).
214. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 145 U.S. 1 (1892); Matter of New
York, 0. & W. Ry., 161 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1947); 0. H. Martin Co. v. Borough of
Sharpsburg, 376 Pa. 242, 102 A.2d 125 (1954).
215. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
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It has long been appreciated that municipal, like state, taxes that
discriminate against the persons or products of interstate commerce
are unconstitutional under the commerce clause. Thus, in 1880 the
United States Supreme Court invalidated a Baltimore ordinance im-
posing a license fee for wharfage because it discriminated against
products coming in from other states. Said the Court:
"Municipal corporations, owning wharves upon the navigable waters
of the United States . . . cannot be permitted, by discriminations
of that character, to impede commercial intercourse and traffic among
the several states and with foreign nations." 216
Later, the Supreme Court ruled that local governmental units and
states cannot exempt locally grown agricultural products while tax-
ing those brought in from interstate commerce. The Court was willing
to generalize quite properly that the commerce clause will invalidate
"all taxes of a discriminatory character levied by a state upon the
products of other states.
'2 17
Due process of law
Although it has been suggested from time to time that due process
of law places no limitation upon the amount of authorized municipal
taxation,218 there are nevertheless a number of decisions to the
effect that due process is violated if the local tax is prohibitive, con-
fiscatory, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The Georgia courts
have consistently followed this doctrine,219 and the Florida court
indicates that it, too, "is committed to the doctrine that if a tax is
such that it impairs one's right to engage in a lawful business or
tends to drive large numbers out of business, it will be stricken
down."220 And the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledges that
the amount of a municipal tax is ordinarily for the legislative body
to determine, but adds: "The rule is subject to the limitation that the
tax imposed should not amount to a prohibition of any useful or
legitimate occupation."' 1 Similarly, the Nebraska court has gone on
record as requiring that occupation and business taxes "must be
reasonable, considering the nature of the business, and not so high as
to prohibit the carrying on of the business."2 Again, the Virginia
Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause a Richmond license tax of fifty dollars
216. Guy v. Mayor & City Council, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880).
217. Darnell & Sons v. Memphis, 208 U.S. 113 (1908). Cf. Best & Co. v.
Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940) (discriminatory state statute invalid).
218. 1 COOLEY, TAXATION § 72, p. 181 (4th ed. 1924).
219. Morton v. City of Macon, 111 Ga. 162, 36 S.E. 627 (1900) ; National Linen
Serv. Corp. v. Milledgeville, 51 Ga. App. 167, 179 S.E. 837 (1935).
220. St. Petersburg v. Florida Coastal Theaters, 43 So. 2d. 525, 527 (Fla. 1949).
221. Louisville v. Pooley, 136 Ky. 286, 124 S.W. 315, 316 (1910).
222. Caldwell v. City of Lincoln, 19 Neb. 569, 27 N.W. 647, 649 (1886).
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upon all businesses not subject by other ordinances to special license
taxes. The Court was concerned with what might happen to news-
boys, bootblacks and similar entrepreneurs when subjected to such
a levy.223 Even in jurisdictions such as these, it is clear that the burden
of proving a municipal tax is unreasonable and confiscatory is upon
the complaining party, and strong evidence is required. 24
When a tax has been authorized by the state legislature and
adopted by the representative body of a municipal corporation, and
then approved by state courts, the United States Supreme Court is
not inclined, in the name of due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to invalidate the local levy as arbitrary. For instance,
in refusing to invalidate a municipal tax imposed upon the owner of
farm lands recently brought into the city and only remotely benefitting
from municipal services, the Supreme Court said: "This court cannot
say in such cases, however great the hardship or unequal the burden
that the tax collected for such (municipal) purpose is taking the
property of the taxpayer without due process of law."22
Bans on "double taxation" are not to be read into due process
clauses in the federal and state constitutions, and the fact that a
municipal corporation twice taxes the same incident, activity or
property is influential only in determining if the legislation is con-
fiscatory or discriminatory.22 6 Though double taxation is not per se
unconstitutional under due process, at times it violates other constitu-
tional provisions and many courts indicate that "it is to be avoided
when possible. '227 The judicial antipathy is effectuated at times by
holdings that the municipal corporation had no power to double tax.
"'An intent to impose double taxation will not be presumed," says
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. "The presumption of law is against
it and continues until overcome by express words of legislation show-
ing such intent."228 Absent a specific state constitutional provision
to that effect, there is no need for municipal taxes to be reasonable
in amount according to the majority view. Typically the California
Supreme Court has said:
"It follows, therefore, that short of being confiscatory or prohibitory,
there is no rule of law that requires a tax to be reasonable in amount,
for the function of taxation is a vital legislative function."229
223. Williams v. Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 14 S.E.2d 287 (1941).
224. National Linen Serv. Corp. v. Milledgeville, 51 Ga. App. 167, 179 S.E.
837 (1935); Gooch Products Co. v. Rothman, 131 Neb. 523, 268 N.W. 468 (1936).
225. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104, U.S. 78, 82-83 (1881).
226. Fox Bakersfield Theater Corp. v. Bakersfield, 36 Cal. 2d 136, 222 P.2d
879 (1950).
227. Appeal of School Dist. of Allentown, 370 Pa. 161, 87 A.2d 480 (1952).
228. Arrott's Estate, 322 Pa. 367, 185 Ati. 697, 698 (1936).
229. Fox Bakersfield Theater Corp. v. Bakersfield, 36 Cal. 2d 136, 222 P.2d
Z79, 882 (1950).
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In the United States jurisdiction to tax is a matter of federal
constitutional law, and the United States Supreme Court has used the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to demarcate local
tax competence. The Court has indicated that the test of whether-a
local tax violates the due process clause is whether it bears some
fiscal relation to the protections, opportunities, and benefits given
by the local government, or in other words, whether the local govern-
ment has given anything for which it can ask a return.20 The test
has been applied by the Ohio Supreme Court which found it satisfied
by the application of a municipal income tax to a non-resident of the
taxing city who earned income within the city. Said the Court:
"The municipality certainly does afford protection against fire, theft,
et cetera, to the place of business of the plaintiff's employer and the
operation thereof without which plaintiff's employer could not as
readily run its business and employ help. In other words, the city
of Toledo does afford, to plaintiff not only a place to work but a place
to work protected by the municipal government of Toledo."'2 1
Jurisdictional due process permits the domicile of an owner of
chattels that have not acquired situs elsewhere to tax the chattels.
23 2
On the other hand, due process is violated where a municipal corpora-
tion taxes a tangible chattel owned by a resident but having acquired
a situs elsewhere.23 3 Where tangible property or intangible rights
represented by negotiable documents have acquired situs in a munic-
ipality they can be taxed by that corporation although owned by non-
residents.234 Where intangibles are concerned any jurisdiction which
affords protection to the right, the owner or the user, can demand a
reasonable charge for the protection afforded. For a long time it
has been accepted that where the intangible was not represented by
a negotiable document situated elsewhere the domicile of the owner
could tax on the theory of mobilia sequuntur personam.m Since
Greenough v. Tax Assessors of the City of Newport,2  the broader
rule just stated has prevailed. In that case it was-rule that the City
of Newport could impose upon a local trustee a tax measured by half
of the value of intangibles held by him and another trustee who was
a non-resident. The letters of trusteeship had been granted by a court
in another state; the evidence of ownership was at all times in another
state; and the life beneficiary resided in another state; yet, because
some protection to the intangibles or the one trustee resident in the
city was found, the United States Supreme Court sustained the tax.
230. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1941).
231. Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1950).
232. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
233. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
234. Old Dominion SS. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
235. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U.S. 54 (1917).
236. 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
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If a corporation has acquired a "commercial domicile" within a
municipal corporation the local community can tax not only the cor-
poration's realty located there and tangible property having situs
there, but also all tangibles not having acquired situs elsewhere and
all intangible values of the corporation.
237
Where property has acquired a "business situs" in a municipality
it can be taxed there even though owned by nonresidents or by foreign
corporations. Illustratively, the Supreme Court has sustained taxes
by the City of New Orleans upon (1) credits evidenced by notes
secured by mortgages, where the owner, a nonresident who had in-
herited them, left them in New Orleans in possession of an agent,
who collected the principal and interest as they became due; 238 (2)
funds in the hands of a local agent of a foreign banking company,
which agent lent the money evidenced by checks drawn upon the
agent, treated as overdrafts and secured by collateral, the checks
and collateral being regularly in the hands of the New Orleans
agent;23 9 and (3) funds lent and re-lent in New Orleans by an agent
of a foreign insurance corporation where the loans were negotiated,
notes sighed, security taken, interest collected and the debts paid in
New Orleans even though the notes were customarily kept out of
town.
240
Lastly, due process of law demands that municipal tax ordinances be
reasonably clear. Where tax ordinances fail to indicate what is being
taxed, or where in any manner such an ordinance is so vague that
courts are unable to determine with any reasonable degree of certainty
whom or what the city intended to tax, the ordinance will be declared
inoperative.
241
As specially limited to license and privilege taxes, the idea of the just
and reasonable tax has been incorporated into the South Carolina
Constitution. It provides: "License or privilege taxes imposed shall
be graduated so as to secure a just imposition of such tax upon the
classes subject thereto. '242 Where a municipal license tax on a busi-
ness did not graduate fairly according to either business or invest-
ment, it was set aside by the South Carolina Court.
243
Requirement of a "public," a "corporate," or a "municipal" purpose
Many courts feel that the taking of taxpayers' moneys for any-
thing but a public purpose is taking property without due process of
law. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court states: "It is well settled that
237. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
238. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899).
239. Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National, 191 U.S. 388 (1903).
240. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907).
241. Puget Sound P. & L. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
242. S.C. CONST., art VIII, § 6.
243. Ex parte Bates, 127 S.C. 167, 120 S.E. 717 (1923).
[ VOL. 8
MUNICIPAL POWER TO TAX
the taking of taxpayers' money for a private purpose is a violation
of the Due Process clause."
2 "
However, it should be pointed out that when the United States
Supreme Court first gave recognition to the public purpose limitation
upon municipal taxation in 1874 in the case of Loan Association v.
Topeka,245 it did not ground the decision or the doctrine upon the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, it seems to
have been treated as an inherent limitation of government. Today,
a number of state constitutions specifically provide that "all taxes shall
be levied and collected for public purposes only.
' '246
No exact and satisfactory definition of public purpose can be given.
Historical criteria have often been applied in deciding what tax
is for a public purpose, but such determinants should not be ex-
clusive. In the Topeka case the United States Supreme Court indicated
that courts:
"must be governed mainly by the course and. usage of the government,
the objects for which taxes have been customarily and byi long course
of legislation levied, what objects or purposes have been considered
necessary to the support and for the proper use of the government,
whether state or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains to this and
is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people may well be
held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of
good government, though this may not be the only criterion of
rightful taxation."247
Other courts attest that historical tests are not to be deemed the
exclusive criteria.2 48 What is a public purpose is in the first instance
for the legislative body. Since the prime responsibility for seeing
that municipal taxes are levied only for public purposes is in the
legislature, the courts customarily defer to the legislative judgment
on whether a particular purpose is a public one.2 49 Consequently, by
law a large discretion is vested in the legislature and courts will not
find a violation of the public purpose test except in clear and extreme
cases. The Texas Supreme Court has typically observed that: "unless
a court can say that the purposea for which public funds are expended
are clearly not public purposes, it would not be justified in holding
invalid a legislative act or provision in a city charter providing funds
244. Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority., 339 Ill. 579, 78 N.E.2d 276, 281
(1948). So, also, Robbins v. Kadyk, 312 Ill. 290, 143 N.E. 863 (1924).
245. 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
246. ARiz. CONST., art. IX, § 1; MONT. CONST., art XII, § 11; OKLA. CONST.,
art. X, § 14. So, also, N.C. CONST., art. V, § 3; S.C. CONST., art VIII, § 3.
247. Loan Ass'n. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 665 (1874).
248. City of Tombstone v. Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 245 Pac. 677 (1927); Nash v.
Town of Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 42 S.E.2d. 209, 212 (1947).
249. "The courts can only be justified, in interposing when a violation of
this principle is clear and the reason for the interference cogent." Loan Ass'n
v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664-65 (1874). So, also, Robbins v. Kadyk, 311 InI. 290,
143 N.E. 863 (1924).
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for such purposes."25 0 Even more- strongly the Illinois Supreme Court
says:
"To justify a, court in declaring, a tax invalid on the ground it was
not imposed for a public purpose, the absence of a public interest must
be clear and palpable."251
More realistically the public purpose limitation can be seen as a
brake upon municipal spending and municipal borrowing, rather than
upon municipal taxation, and the issues are customarily precipitated
by bills to enjoin local borrowing and spending. In practice, cases in-
volving the public purpose limitation upon spending and borrowing
can be used analogically here. Some of the principal decisions involving
the public purpose limitation upon the municipal tax power follow.
Taxation to aid private concerns and individuals has customarily been
accepted as not for a public purpose.
252
In an interesting case it has been ruled that taxing to erect a mu-
nicipal hotel violated the doctrine.25 3 Spending to aid sectarian schools
is usually thought to be violative.25 The Constitution of Arizona spe-
cifically provides that "No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public
money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or
any public service corporation."255 Similar clauses exist in a few other
states.255 And the Arizona Court has ruled that it was not a proper
public purpose of a city for it to tax to erect an armory to belong to
and be used by the state.
25 7
On the other hand, courts have ruled that within the public purpose
doctrine was municipal taxation for:
schools25 8  parks2 6'
hospitals25 9  playgrounds
26 2
libraries260  water works
263
250. Davis v. City of Taylor, 123 Tex. 39, 67 S.W.2d 1033, 1034 (1934).
251. People ex tel. Thompson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 397 Ill. 319, 74 N.E.2d
510, 512 (1947). See, Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9 (1866); Hays v. Kalamazoo,
316 Mich. 443, 25 N.W.2d 787 (1947).
252. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
253. Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N.C. 283, 42 S.E.2d 209, 25 N.C.L. REV. 504
(1947).
254. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Atchison, 47 Kan. 712, 28 Pac. 1000 (1892).
255. ARiz. CONST., art. IX, § 10.
256. NEV. CONST., art. XI, § 10; N.M. CONST., art. IV, § 31; ORE. CONST., art.
I, § 5; UTM CONS., art. I, § 4.
257. McClintock v. Phoenix, 24 Ariz. 155, 207 Pac. 611 (1922).
258. Cook v. School Dist., 266 Ill. 164, 107 N.E. 327 (1914). People ex Tel.
Carr v. Railway, 316 Ill 410, 147 N.E. 492 (1925); Collie v. Franklin County,
145 N.C. 171, 59 S.E. 44 (1907).
259. Burleson v. Spruce Pine, 200 N.C. 30, 156 S.E. 241 (1930).
260. Westbrook v. Southern Pines, 215 N.C. 20, 1 S.E.2d 95 (1939).
261. Yarborough v. Park Comm'n, 196 N.C. 284, 145 S.E. 563 (1928).
262. Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N.C. 655, 200 S.E. 416 (1939).
263. Speas v. Kansas City, 329 Mo. 184, 44 S.W.2d 108 (1931).
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public fairs264  electric lighting plant 270
advertising the city265 auditorium271
airports266  community building272
laying out streets267  paying legitimate municipal debts2 73
subway systems 268  filling station 2 74
coal yards 269  recreation center & swimming pool 2 75
Courts seem well agreed that it is not necessary, in order that a
use may be regarded as public, that it should be for the use and
benefit of every person in the municipal corporation.2 7 6 The Supreme
Court has indicated that it will defer both to the legislative determina-
tion of the state and municipal governing bodies, and also to the state
courts, and the Court is not inclined readily to hold that local taxation
is violative of the public purpose doctrine.277
In addition to the requirement that municipal taxation be for a
public purpose, in a number of states it must be for a "corporate"
purpose.27 8 Thus, the Tennessee Constitution reads: "The General
Assembly shall have power to authorize the several counties and
incorporated towns in this state, to impose taxes for county and
corporation purposes respectively, in such manner as shall be pre-
scribed by law."2 79
This concept can be no more readily and satisfactorily defined than
the public purpose limitation. As to it the Illinois Supreme Court
once admitted that in many cases "the most intelligent and candid
minds would differ." 0 What is a proper "corporate" purpose depends
intrinsically upon what kind of a municipal corporation is involved.
Something that would be a proper corporate purpose for an irrigation
264. Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 141 S.E. 576 (1928).
265. Miller v. Ryan, 54 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1951); Davis v. City of Taylor, 123
Tex. 39, 67 S.W.2d 1033 (1934).
266. Turner v. Reidsville, 224 N.C. 42, 29 S.E.2d1 211 (1944).
267. In re Lockitt, 58 Misc. 5, 110 N.Y. Supp. 52. (1908).
268. City of Boston v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 309 (1922).
269. Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
270. Mitchell v. City of Negaunee, 113 Mich. 359, 71 N.W. 646 (1897).
271. Adams v. Durham, 189 N.C. 232, 126 S.E. 611 (1925); Ashmore v. Greater
Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E.2d 88 (1947).
272. Robbins v. Kadyk, 312 Ill. 290, 143 N.E. 863 (1924).
273. People ex rel. Thompson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 397 Ill. 319, 74 N.E.2d
510 (1947).
274. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N.W. 962, aff'd,
275 U.S. 504 (1927).
275. Marshall v. Rose, 213 S.C. 428, 44 S.E.2d 720 (1948).
.276. Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 141 S.E. 597, 599-600 (1928).
277. Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917); Standard Oil Co. v. City
of Lincoln, 275 U.S. 504 (1928).
278. COLO. CONST., art. X, § 7; IDAHO CONST., art. VII, § 6; ILL. CONST., art.IX, § 9; Ky. CONST., § 181; MONT. CONST., art. XII, § 4; OKLA. CONST., art. X,
§ 20; UTAH CONST., art. XIII, § 5; WASH. CONST., art. XI, § 12; S.C. CONST., art.
X, § 5.
279. TENN. CONST., art. II, § 29.
280. Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9, 11 (1866).
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district might well be an improper corporate purpose for a port author-
ity. The Illinois Supreme Court has well said:
"Corporate purposes for which taxes can be levied by a municipal
corporation are only such as are germane to the objects of the
creation of the municipality or have a legitimate connection with those
objects and a manifest relation thereto."281
At times the "corporate" purpose limitation is understood to be
something very similar to the public purpose rule. Thus, both are
violated by aiding private business. Illustratively, when merchants
desired to have a city tax and to borrow for the purpose of erecting
a bridge outside of the city to bring in as customers farmers living
in the area, the taxing and borrowing were judicially forbidden as
not being for a corporate purpose.2 2 So, also, it has been held by the
Tennessee court that there is no corporate purpose in using tax funds
to erect a manufacturing plant to aid private industry.283 In fact,
the Utah Supreme Court has expressed the view that the state con-
stitutional clause, "for all purposes of such corporation," is synony-
mous with the public purpose rule.28 4
At other times the "corporate" purpose limitation appears as a
requirement that the local taxes be used to the advantage principally
of the people of the municipal corporation. To illustrate, because a
Missouri court felt that a tourist camp to be erected with tax funds
would primarily benefit outsiders rather than the residents of the
municipality, it was held not to be a "corporate" purpose.285 Sim-
ilarly Justice Barnhill of the North Carolina Court has stated:
"It must be a corporate purpose directly connected with the local gov-
ernment and having for its objective the promotion of the public
health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity or con-
tentment of the inhabitants or residents within the political division
from whence the revenue for its support is derived."286
However, as in the public purpose concept, it is clear that a tax can
be for a "corporate" purpose even though not every single person in
the municipality is benefitted.287 And taxing to be constitutional un-
der a corporate purpose limitation need not be solely for the bene-
281. People ex rel. Brenza v. Fleetwood, 413 Ill. 530, 109 N.E.2d 741, 753
(1952). So, also: People v. Chicago, 413 Ill. 83, 108 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1952); Koscis
v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 Ill. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935).
282. Manning v. City of Devils Lake, 13 N.D. 47, 99 N.W. 51 (1904).
283. Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 275 S.W. 29 (1925). Cf. Weismer v.
Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91 (1876).
284. Denver & R.G. R.R. v. Grand County, 51 Utah 294, 170 Pac. 74, 76 (1917).
285. Kennedy v. City of Nevada, 222 Mo. App. 459, 281 S.W. 56 (1926).
286. Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36
S.E.2d 803, 813-14 (1946) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
287. Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9 (1866).
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fit of the people of the corporation. Thus, in sustaining a tax for
a municipal park, the Missouri Supreme Court overrode objections
that it would not be corporate if outsiders used it freely, remarking:
"The fact that people residing beyond the corporate limits of the
city may receive occasional benefit and, enjoyment from the use of the
park does not deprive that purpose of its corporate character."288
In some states it is required that taxes by municipal corporations
be for "municipal" purposes.289 The requirement is very close to
the corporate purpose limitation and, at times, like the public pur-
pose doctrine, in preventing taxation for private benefits. The
analogies can be detected from the language of a California appel-
late court which says that "the true test" of what is a municipal
affair or purpose "is that which requires that the work should be
essentially public, and for the general good of all the inhabitants
of the city. 2 90 The same point is reinforced by the statement of the
North Carolina Supreme Court to the effect that:
"In the case of a municipality, the tax to be valid must be for a city
or municipal purpose, in a legal sense, as well as for a public one,
that is, the objects to be attained, must affect the people as a com-
munity and not merely as individuals." 291
Courts in states requiring that local taxation be for a municipal
purpose have found the limitation satisfied by taxing: (a) to con-
struct a state highway through a city,292 (b) to finance a survey of
an area sewage problem by a number of municipalities, 293 and (c)
to develop a park.29 There is no more possibility of announcing a
general satisfactory test for "municipal" or "corporate" purposes
than for public purposes. These constitutional provisions were probably
intended in those states not having specific public purpose limitations
288. Vrooman v. St. Louis, 327 Mo. 933, 88 S.W.2d 189, 193 (1935). In
addition to such park, courts have illustratively found corporate purposes
in taxing: (a) to pay, off the debts of a municipal corporation, Denman v.
Tacoma, 172 Wash. 406, 16 P.2d 596 (1932); (b) to maintain schools, People
ex rel. Carr v. Railway, 316 Ill. 410, 147 N.E. 492 (1925); (c) to maintain
libraries, Robbins v. Kadyk, 312 Ill. 290, 143 N.E. 863 (1924); Dickinson v. Salt
Lake City, 57 Utah 530, 195 Pac. 1110 (1921); (d) to provide a water supply,
Kenton Water Co. v. City of Covington, 156 Ky. 596, 161 S.W. 988 (1913);
(e) to pay bounties to volunteers in time of war, Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9
(1866); (f) for civil defense, People v. Chicago, 413 Ill. 83, 108 N.E.2d 16
(1952); and (g) to pay legitimate debts of the municipality, Stone v. Chicago,
207 Ill. 492, 69 N.E. 970 (1904).
289. CAL. CONST., art. XI, § 12; FLA. CoNsT., art, IX § 5; N. C. CONsT., art.
X; MONT. CONST., art. XII, § 3.
290. Bank v. Bell, 62 Cal. App. 320, 217 Pac. 538, 542 (1923).
291. Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 141 S.E. 597, 599 (1928).
292. Perez v. City of San Jose, 107 Cal. App. 2d 562, 237 P.2d 548 (1951).
See, Jackson v. Rome, 182 Ga. 848, 187 S.E. 386 (1936).
293. Oakland v. Williams, 15 Cal. 2d 542, 103 P.2d 168 (1940).
294. Yarborough v. Park Comm'n, 196 N.C. 284, 145 S.E. 563 (1928).
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in their constitutions to hold municipalities to some such limitation,
and in states having specific public purpose limitations to ensure that
taxing by a city is primarily for the benefit of the taxpayers of the
city, rather than for the advantage of those living in adjacent areas or
the state generally. As in the public purpose limitation there is
considerable judicial deference to legislative determinations that
particular tax purposes are "municipal." Thus, the North Carolina
Supreme Court indicates:
"Where the question is doubtful ... and, the Legislature has decided
it one way, and the people to be taxed have approved that decision,
it is the general rule of construction that the will of the lawmakers,
thus expressed and approved, should be allowed to prevail over mere
doubts of the courts."295
Similarly, historical considerations influence the courts in these states
in determining what is for a municipal purpose although a California
court has noted that once the test seems satisfied "novelty should
impose no veto. '2 96 The remark is appropriate, indeed, whether the
test be one of "municipal," "corporate," or "public" purpose.
Equality and uniformity
The equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and comparable clauses in state constitu-
tions demand that all taxpayers be treated by municipal corporations
with substantial equality. So, the United States Supreme Court has
held that a clearly discriminatory assessment on personal property
is violative of the equal protection clause. The Court stated:
"The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects the individual from state action which selects him out for dis-
criminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on
others of the same class. The right is the right to equal treatment.
He may not complain if equality is achieved by increasing the same
taxes of other members of the class to the level of his own. The con-
stitutional requirement, however, is not satisfied if a state does not
itself remove the discrimination, but imposes on him against whom the
discrimination has been directed the burden of seeking an upward
revision of the taxes of other members of the class. ' '297
There are state constitutional clauses as well requiring municipal
taxation to be applied with equality.
2 93
Discrimination against groups in favor of other groups equally
situated violates the equal protection clause. A Texas court has well
295. Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 141 S.E. 597, 600 (1928).
296. Bank v. Bell, 62 Cal. App. 320, 217 Pac. 538, 542 (1923).
297. Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946).
298. IND. CONST., art. X, § 1; MIss. CONST., art. IV, § 112.
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observed that "the courts uniformly hold that taxing authorities cannot
lawfully discriminate in favor of one group of property owners against
another group and that such action is void if and when attempted."299
Precise and exact equality of treatment is often impossible in
the administration of municipal tax laws and it is not demanded of
municipal corporations by the courts. The United States Supreme
Court has indicated:
"The Equal Protection clause does not require the state to maintain
a rigid rule of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to main-
tain a precise scientific uniformity; and possible differences in tax
burdens not shown to be substantial or which are based on discrimina-
tions not shown to be arbitrary or capricious, do not fall within con-
stitutional prohibitions."300
Similarly, the majority of state courts hold that equal protection is
satisfied when no person or class of persons in the municipal corpora-
tion is taxed at a different rate than are other persons in the munici-
pality uponthe same value or the same thing, and where the objects
of taxation are the same by whomsoever owned, or whatever they
be.301
Equal protection requires that classifications in municipal tax
ordinances be reasonable and not arbitrary. Classifications must
be based upon real and substantial differences having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the municipal legislation. So, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has stated: "While the state may classify
broadly the subjects of taxation, it must do so on a rational basis so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
'30 2
When irrational classifications have been used in municipal tax
ordinances they have been judicially invalidated. For instance, an
Ohio court set aside Youngstown's income tax ordinance because
it fixed one rate for individuals and another and higher rate for
corporations. 303 So, too, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held viola-
tive of equality and uniformity constitutional provisions an ordinance
imposing a tax of two hundred and fifty dollars a year upon businesses
at a fixed place less than a year. The Court concluded:
"The fact alone that a merchant is in business for less than a year
is not a sound reason for placing him in a different classification
-for tax purposes than that occupied, by a competitor who stays in
business for more than a year. The difference upon which the classi-
cation is based must be substantial and upon a natural and reasonable
basis."
304
,299. Reynolds v. Crudgington, 266 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
300. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 284 (1932).
301. Norris v. Waco, 57 Tex. 635 (1882).
302. Barker Bros. v. Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 603, 76 P.2d 97, 99 (1938).
303. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Youngstown, 91 Ohio App. 431, 108
N.E.2d 571 (1951).
304. Louisville v. Koehler, 264 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Ky. 1954).
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'There are many additional illustrations of judicial invalidation of
municipal tax ordinances where the discrimination bears no reasonable
or just relation to the tax ordinance in respect to which the classifi-
cation is made or, in other words, when it is arbitrary and without
a rational basis. So, the classification of instalment sellers into
those selling house furnishings and wearing apparel and all others
was ruled invalid.30 5 And a California court has held unconstitutional
an ordinance taxing the sale after a fire of others' goods but not the
sale of one's own goods. Said this Court:
"A municipality may not discriminate between persons similarly
situated and engaged in similar businesses, by imposing different
license taxes upon them. It may only classify various businesses
carried on within its boundaries when each group of classified busi-
nesses naturally falls into one class and, such classification must be
based upon reasonable or natural distinctions."306
Because distinctions in municipal tax ordinances discriminating
against out-of-town merchants are often regarded as unreasonable,
such discriminations are frequently set aside by the courts. So, the
California Supreme Court invalidated a San Francisco ordinance
taxing merchants having goods in the city one hundred dollars a
year while imposing a levy of two thousand dollars a year upon
merchants selling in the city from stocks outside.3 7 Another Cali-
fornia court similarly set aside an ordinance taxing local laundries at
twelve dollars a year but imposing a tax ten times that amount upon
out-of-town laundries serving customers within the city.30 8 And the
Florida Supreme Court has voided an ordinance imposing a tax of
two hundred and fifty dollars per truck upon wholesale bakeries from
outside the city but delivering in the city when there was no com-
parable tax upon local wholesale bakeries.30 9 However, it is not to
be concluded that all differences in treatment involving out-of-town
concerns are unreasonable and invalid. To illustrate, a California
court has sustained a municipal ordinance imposing a license tax of
one hundred and fifty dollars per year upon out-of-town bakeries
selling within the city but only fifty dollars upon local bakeries,
when it was proved that the local establishments also had to pay
the municipal corporation additional taxes under other ordinances so,
that the end result produced a rough equality.
310
305. Puget Sound P. & L. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
306. Ex parte Hoskins, 16 Cal. App. 2d 51, 60 P.2d 535, 537 (1936).
307. Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal. 606, 28 Am. Rep. 642 (1877).
308. In re Hines, 33 Cal. App. 45, 164 Pac. 339 (1917).
309. O'Connell v. Kontojohn, 131 Fla. 783, 179 So. 802 (1938). See also:
Town of St. Helena v. Butterworth, 198 Cal. 230, 244 Pac. 357 (1926); In re-
Robinson, 68 Cal. App. 744, 230 Pac. 175 (1924).
310. Continental Baking Co. v. City of Escondida, 21 Cal. App. 2d 388, 69
P.2d 181 (1937).
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From what has been said, it should be clear that the equal pro-
tection clauses do not prevent all classification and, in fact, a wide
discretion is accorded municipal legislative bodies in the imposition
of taxes.31' The permissible degree or extent of legislative discretion
is variously described by the courts. The Kentucky Supreme Court,
by way of illustration, states:
"It is familiar law that the selection of subjects of classification for
taxation founded upon a natural and, reasonable basis, with- a logical
relation to the purposes and objectives of a statute or ordinance, does
not offend the principles of equality or uniformity in the imposition
of a tax... so long as it operates equally upon all within a class."
31 2
Under such principles municipal corporations can thus impose lighter
burdens upon some classifications or taxpayers, and even exempt some
classes or businesses from municipal taxation, without violating equal
protection of the laws.313 "It is not necessary," says the California
Supreme Court, "for the validity of a general occupational license
tax ordinance that the legislative body include every kind of a
business or occupation within its provisions if the discrimination is
based upon some reasonable distinction. 31 4 In effect most courts
indulge in a presumption that the classifications used by legislative
bodies for tax purposes are reasonable, and strong proof of unreason-
ableness is required to prove a denial of equal protection. Typically,
the Nebraska Supreme Court remarks:
"The municipal authorities may, by ordinance classify the different
occupations for taxation, and impose different taxes in. different
amounts upon the different classes; and, a classification made by such
authorities will not be interfered with by the courts, unless it mani-
festly appears that the classification is unreasonable and arbi-
trary."315
Generally, adjusting the amount of a municipal tax to the size
or amount of business in a class does not violate requirements of
equal protection and uniformity. Thus, the United States Supreme
Court has sustained an ordinance taxing merchants five dollars if
their sales amounted to less than a thousand dollars a year, ten' dollars
if sales were between one thousand and twenty-five hundred, fifteen
dollars if sales were between twenty-five hundred and five thousand,
311. Barker Bros. v. Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 603, 76 P.2d 97 (1938).
312. Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248, 256 (1948).
313. Fox Bakersfield Theater Corp. v. Bakersfield, 36 Cal 2d 136, 222
P.2d 879, 884 (1950).
314. Barker Bros. v. Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d. 603, 76 P.2d 97, 99 (1938).
315. Norris v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 658, 142 N.W. 114, 115 (1913). The
classification must be "palpably arbitrary" before violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913) (upholding
license tax on theaters classified, by price of admission). Fox Bakersfield
Theater Corp. v. Bakersfield, 36 Cal. 2d 136, 222 P.2d 879 (1950).
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twenty-five dollars if sales were between five and ten thousand dollars,
and increasing to one hundred dollars if sales were over sixty thousand
dollars a year. Only reasonable uniformity in dealing with parties
similarly situated is required by the equal protection clause, said
the Court.316 There are many more illustrations of municipal tax
ordinances sustained by the courts as utilizing constitutional classifi-
cations. Recently, for instance, the Supreme Court sustained the St.
Louis municipal income tax which taxed workers upon their earnings,
but taxed business concerns upon their net profits.317 The same
classification has been upheld by state courts. 318 Again, by way of
illustration, the Washington Supreme Court has upheld a municipality
in classifying for tax purposes concerns making chattel loans dif-
ferently than other banking institutions.319 And, as suggested earlier,
a number of municipal corporations have been sustained in distinguish-
ing between itinerant merchants and others with regular places of
business. 320 And, as suggested earlier, so long as over-all tax ob-
ligations to the municipality of local merchants approximately equal
the particular levy upon out-of-town merchants doing business in the
city, courts are inclined to find that constitutional requirements of
equality and uniformity have not been violated.32'
Many state constitutions contain a requirement that there be uni-
formity of taxation.32 The demands are substantially similar to the
requirements of equal protection indicated above. As there, the
courts are agreed that mathematical precision in uniformity and
equality is not demanded, but reasonable approximations will suffice.3
23
The same reasonable classification adequate for equal protection has
been held to satisfy a uniformity clause. So, in sustaining Phila-
delphia's income tax ordinance subjecting workers to a tax on their
earnings, while taxing business on its net profits, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court said that classification "may properly be made accord-
ing to reasonable, just and practical rules . .. 324 In some states the
316. Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 329 (1902). So, also, Brannen v. States-
boro, 210 Ga. 474, 80 S.E.2d 805 (1954).
317. Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
318. Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (194 9).
319. Austin v. Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646 (1934).
320. Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412, 44 Pac. 725 (1896).
321. Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. 2d 405, 65 P.2, 884 (1936); Hoffman
Candy Co. v. Newport Beach, 102 Cal. App. 525, 8 P.2d 235 (1932); Richmond
Linen Co. v. Lynchburg, 160 Va. 644, 169 S.E. 554 (1933).
322. E.g., "Taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within
the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same." S.C. CoNsT., art. VIII,
§ 6. So, also: AMiz. CONST., art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST., art. X, § 3; GA. CONST.,
art. X, § 1; IND. CONST., art. X, § 1; McIH. CONST., art. X, § 3; Mhss. CONST.,
art. IV, § 112; OHIO CONST., art. XII § 2; TENN. CONST., art. II, § 28.
323. Sweet v. Auburn, 134 Me. 28, 180 Atl. 803 (1935). Some typical state
uniformity clauses are: ILL. CONsT., art. IX, § 1; McIH. CONST., art. X, § 3;
PA. CONST., art. IX, § 3; TEx. CONST., art. VIII, § 1.
324. Dole v. Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 375, 11 A.2d 165, 166 (1940).
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constitutional requirement of uniformity applies to all taxes,M but
in others the state constitutional provision applies only to direct*
taxation of property. 6 In these jurisdictions municipal corporations
can impose excise taxes free of the restraint and here the consti-
tutional limitation does not prevent variety or differences in taxation
of privileges, or the exercise of wide discretion in the selection of
subjects or classification of business, trades, professions or occupa-
tions.3
7
Even where these constitutional provisions apply to all municipal
taxes they do not require license and privilege taxes upon different
occupations, professions and trades to be alike, so long as there is uni-
formity as to all members of a class.3 Accordingly, when the classifi-
cation is reasonable, different taxes can be imposed upon out-of-town
firms delivering in a municipality than those upon local firms in the
same trade. Illustratively, the South Carolina court has upheld a
municipal tax of twenty-five dollars a year upon local bakeries as
compared with one of fifty dollars upon out-of-town bakeries, over
objections based upon this clause. 9 So, too, chain stores can be sub-
jected to higher taxes when the classification is reasonable. 330 Again,
money lenders upon personal property can be treated apart from
bankers.
331
The Illinois Supreme Court has set forth what is necessary to
secure uniformity under the constitution of that state. Says this
Court:
"Two things are essential: First, the assessments shall be just an
equal, in proportion to the value of the property, liable to, assessment;
and secondly, when thus assessed, the rate shall be uniform as to
every person, and on every species of property, returned by the
assessor for taxation."332
Accordingly, where only one kind of property is taxed, or only
property in one part of the municipal corporation, or where assess-
ments or rates are unjustifiably different as to property or persons of
the same class, the uniformity requirement is violated.3 Furthermore,
exemptions in municipal tax ordinances may well violate such con-
stitutional clauses. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck
325. As in Pennsylvania. Butcher v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d ,298
(1938).
326. As in Georgia and Kentucky. Solomons v. Savannah, 183 Ga. 631, 189
S.E. 230 (1937); Louisville v. Weis, 269 Ky. 554, 108 S.W.2d 515 (1937).
327. Jackson v. Glenwood Springs, 122 Colo. 323, 221 P.2d 1083 (1950). See,
also, cases cited in note 326, supra.
328. Hill v. City Council, 59 S.C. 396, 38 S.E. 11 (1901).
329. American Bakeries Co. v. Sumter, 173 .S.C. 94, 174 S.E. 919 (1934).
330. Great A. & P. Co. v. Spartanburg, 170 S.C. 262, 170 S.E. 273 (1933).
331. Cowart v. City Council, 67 S.E. 34, 45 S.E. 122 (1903).
332. Sherlock v. Village of Winnetka, 68 Ill. 530, 535 (1873).
333. Village of Lemont v. Jenks, 197 Ill. 363, 64 N.E. 362 (1902); People
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down the sections of the Philadelphia income tax ordinance exempting
domestic servants, farm laborers and farmers selling their own pro-
duce as well as a credit to all those who filed returns of fifteen dol-
lars.334 And the Mississippi court has emphasized that such a clause
requires exemptions to extend to all in a class within the city, such as
all hotels, and not but a single one.335
In states having uniformity clauses, lack of uniformity in valuation
of property is not proved by showing merely the proximity of
property assessed at lower figures, as it is a matter of common knowl-
edge that land values in cities even in one block vary considerably
and it is up to a complainant to establish that other properties se-
lected by him for comparison are similar.3 6
Uniformity requirements in some states are interpreted to pro-
hibit double taxation. Thus, the Michigan court has ruled: "The state
constitution requires that there be a uniform rule of taxation and this
forbids double taxation. 337 And- this court has held a city could not
tax both the capital of a domestic corporation and the interests of
shareholders. It observed: "The taxation of shares to the shareholder,
and property to the corporation, is clearly double taxation, within the
spirit of the constitutional provisions .... The constitution does not
permit the taxation of both property and shares."338 A similar in-
terpretation is found in Mississippi.3 39 And the Idaho uniformity
clause adds specifically: "provided, further, that duplicate taxation of
property for the same purpose during the same year, is hereby pro-
hibited.,,340
Requirements of uniformity and equality do not demand equality
and uniformity between all municipal corporations in a state in the
matter of local taxes. It is only necessary that taxes be uniform and
equal within the municipal corporation where they apply.341 This is
spelled out specifically in the constitutions of a number of states.3 42
New Hampshire has a constitutional provision to the effect that
taxes shall be proportional and reasonable which the Supreme Court
of that state has construed to mean equal and just.3 43 According to
the court the requirement demands that there shall be uniformity
ex Tel. Johnson v. Robinson, 406 Ill. 280, 94 N.E.2d 151 (1950); Premm v.
Belleville, 59 Ill 142 (1871); Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Aurora, 99 InI. 205 (1881).
334. Butcher v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A.2d 298 (1938). Contra:
Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948).
335. Jackson v. Edwards House, 145 Miss. 135, 110 So. 231 (1926).
336. People ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 406 Ill. 280, 94 N.E.2d 151 (1950).
337. First Nat'l Bank v. Detroit, 253 Mich. 89, 95, 234 N.W. 151 (1931).
338. Stroh v. Detroit, 131 Mich. 109, 114, 90 N.W. 1029 (1902).
339. Panola County v. Carrier, 92 Miss. 148, 45 So. 426 (1908).
340. IDAHO CONST., Art. VII, § 5.
341. Smith v. Robertsor4 210 S.C. 99, 41 S.E.2d 631 (1947); Nashville C. &
St. L. R.R. v. Marshall County, 161 Tenn. 236, 30 S.W.2d 268 (1930).
342. IDAHO CoNsT., art. VII, § 5; MONT. CONST., Art. XII, § 11.
343. N.H. CoNsT., part II, art. V. Opinion of the Justices, 4 N.H. 565 (1829).
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both in the mode of assessment and the rate of taxation, and when
a New Hampshire municipal corporation assessed stock in trade
at its full value while other properties were assessed at only a per-
centage of full value the tax was invalidated.
3 "
Where discriminations that are unreasonable and unfair are im-
posed upon out-of-state citizens in taxing their activities within a
municipal corporation, the courts have at times set aside such munici-
pal levies as violative of the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourth Article of the United States Constitution. 345 Since this clause
is in the language of "citizens" it avails neither corporations nor aliens.
Freedom of communication; Freedom of religion
It has been categorically announced that privileges secured by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution cannot be taxed by
municipal corporations.346 This seems to be quite true so far as munici-
pal license taxation of religious colporteurs is concerned. For example,
the United States Supreme Court has invalidated, as applied to
distributors of religious books, a municipal license tax of a dollar and
a half per day, seven dollars a week, twelve dollars for two weeks, or
twenty dollars for three weeks. The fact that the distributors sold
pamphlets for five cents and booklets for twenty-five cents did not strip
them of their constitutional protection under the First Amendment.
The Court indicated its apprehension that the cumulative effect of
many such municipal taxes would stamp out the distribution of such
religious literature, and used broad language indicating that no
municipal license tax upon religious activities would be constitu-
tional. The opinion also indicates that distributors of religious litera-
ture are to be given greater constitutional protection than distributors
of other printed materials. Said the Court: "The constitutional rights
of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and
written word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers
or wholesalers of books. '347 The following year the Court indicated
that the home town of religious colporteurs had no greater power to
subject them to license taxes.348 There are additional decisions indicat-
ing the unconstitutionality of all license taxes upon distributors of
religious literature.349
The Supreme Court has indicated that publishers of newspapers and
magazines are not immune from the general forms of local taxation.
Said the Court in the Grosjean case: "It is not intended by anything
344. Bemis Bros. v. Claremont, 102 A.2d 512 (N.H. 1954).
345. O'Connell v. Kontojohn, 131 Fla. 783, 179 So. 802 (1938).
346. Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 327 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
347. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
348. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
349. Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Busey v. District of
Columbia, 138 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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we.have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune
from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for the support of the
government.' 5 0 And there is further dictum in the Murdock case in-
dicating the probable constitutionality of municipal property and
income taxes in their applicability to publishers or preachers. There
the Court stated:
"We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free
from all financial burdens of government. We have here something
quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who
engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed
in connection with those activities. It is quite another to exact a tax
from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon." 351
Accordingly, the imposition of a general ad valorem property tax upon
the-personal property of a religious organization has been sustained
as constitutional, even when the property taxed consisted of religious
literature. Said the California Supreme Court: "Instrumentalities used
in-connection with the press and the publication business are subject
to -normal uniform general taxation."352 And, should it be considered
proper tax policy, there is good reason to sustain the constitutionality
of. municipal income taxes in their application to the earnings of
ministers.
353
,The dictum in the Murdock case that the usual publisher need not
be -accorded the full constitutional protection from local taxes enjoyed
by the., distributors of religious literature has encouraged municipal
corporations to impose business and license taxes upon both publishers
and also upon distributors of advertising matter. The Tampa business
license tax upon the gross receipts of newspaper publishers has been
upheld by the Florida Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question.35
In another opinion in which the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari the California courts found no violation of freedom of the
presstfrom a non-discriminatory business tax upon newspapers.355
Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court indicated that the "Legisla-
ture has adequate constitutional power to authorize a municipality
to impose reasonable non-discriminatory license fees on local news-
paper publishing businesses. 356 And there is additional evidence that
..350. -Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
351. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943).
352. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Los Angeles County, 30 Cal. 2d
426, 182 P.2d 178, 181 (1947).
853. Ross v. Philadelphia, 149 Pa. Super. 33, 25 A.2d 834 (1942).
354. Tampa Times Co. v. Tampa, 158 Fla. 589, 29 So. 2d 368, appeal dismissed,
332 U.S. 749 (1947).
355. City of Corona v. Corona Daily Independent, 115 Cal. 2d 382, 252 P.2d
56, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 327 (1953).
356. City of Absecon v. Vettese, 13 N.J. 581, 100 A.2d 750, 753 (1953).
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occupation, business and license taxes can constitutionally be imposed
upon publishers by municipal corporations,357 although in doubtful
cases courts will hold municipal power did not exist.
58
On one hand, distributors of advertising material are probably en-
titled to even less immunity from municipal taxation than are news-
papers.359 On the other hand, distributors of tracts on economics,
government and philosophy are in theory entitled to share the broader
immunity of religious colporteurs-which means freedom from all local
-license taxes.
.Constitutional, statutory and charter limitations upon the amount of
municipal taxation
Constitutional limitations upon the amount of municipal taxation
are common. Similar limitations are at times found in statutes and
in municipal charters. Some of these are expressed in terms of mills
per dollar value of property,3 60 with at times a slight variation being
stated in terms of percentages of valuation.361 The Alabama Constitu-
tion, for instance, provides: "No city, town, village or other municipal
corporation ... shall levy or collect a higher rate of taxation in any
one year on the property situated therein than one-half of one per-
cent of the value of such property so assessed for state taxation during
the preceding year.' '362 Some limitations are expressed in terms of
dollars per capita,363 while yet others are indicated in terms of absolute
amounts.364 In some jurisdictions a positive limitation is stated but
municipal authorities are permitted to impose additional taxes with
the approval of the local electorate. The Michigan Constitution, for
example, reads:
"The total amount of taxes assessed against property for all purposes
in any one year shall not exceed one and one-half percent of the
assessed value of said property, except taxes levied for the payment
of interest and principal on obligations heretofore incurred which
sums, shall be separately assessed in all cases: Provided, that this
limitation may be increased for a period not to exceed twenty years
at any time, to not more than a total of five percent of the assessed
valuation, by a majority vote of the electors of any assessing district,
or when provided for by the charter of a municipal corporation" 365
357. Giragi v. Moore, 48 Ariz. 33, 58 P.2d 1249, 64 P.2d 819 (1936), appeal
dismissed, 301 U.S. 670 (1937); In re Jager, 24 S.C. 438, 7 S.E. 605 (1888);
Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Publishing Co., 95 Va. 564, 28 S.E. 959 (1898).
358. City of Absecon v. Vettese, 13 N.J. 581, 100 A.2d 750 (1953).
359. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. v. City of Bellevue, 283 Ky. 152, 140 S.W.2d
;1024 (1940).
360. People v. Banks, 168 Misc. 515, 6 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1938).
361. Harsha v. Detroit, 261 Mich. 586, 246 N.W. 849 (1933).
362. ALA. CONST. 1901, art. XI, § 216.
363. Minnesota Laws of 1921, c. 417, § 1 (one hundred dollars).
364. In addition to the New York constitutional limitation to two percent
of the average of the" last fLve property valuations, the 1953 state legislature
limited New York City's taxes from real estate to fifty million dollars.
365. MIcH. CONST., art. X, § 21 (as amended 1932).
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In North Carolina no tax can be levied by municipal corporations,
except those for "necessary expenses," without the consent of a
majority of the voters in the municipality.36
In some states constitutional provisions are interpreted as allowing
home rule cities and those with freeholders charters to exceed the
usual limit. Thus, in Michigan the court has ruled that the fifteen mill
limitation in the amendment does not apply to cities which come with-
in the exception noted therein.36 7 However, the same court has ruled
that the home rule cities are subject to legislative control in the matter
of tax limitations and collections.368 And Ohio, an even stronger home-
rule state, has brought the taxing power of municipal corporations
under the supremacy of the legislature which can preclude particular
municipal taxes by itself "pre-empting the field.
'36 9
The limitations indicated above are generally binding not only on
the governing body of the municipal corporation but also on all
agencies acting for the corporation in any way, such as fire and
police pension boards.370 When a municipal levy exceeds the limita-
tion, the excess is void.371 When a local tax is illegal because in excess
of one of the indicated limitations, the county and local officials can
refuse to spread the tax over the rolls.
372
Notwithstanding these limitations it is customarily possible for a
municipal corporation to tax above the limit to pay for municipal
obligations not voluntarily entered into by the municipality. So,
taxes can generally be levied by a city to pay for tort judgments
even when it means exceeding the applicable limitation.3 3 And so,
too, taxes can be levied by a municipal corporation to finance obliga-
tions imposed by higher governmental authorities.37 4 However, where
as in Missouri the constitutional limitation extends to "taxes of every
kind and description," the courts have held that a tax cannot be levied
to pay for a judgment against a municipality in a personal injury
action.376 And it is the general rule that municipal corporations cannot
366. N.C. CoNsT., art. VII, § 7. What are "necessary expenses" within, the
clause is ably indicated in Coates and Mitchell, Necessary Expenses, 18
N.C.L. REv. 93 (1940), and, in a Note, 25 N.C.L. REV. (1947).
367. School Dist. of Pontiac v. City of Pontiac, 262 Mich. 338, 247 N.W. 474
(1933).
368. Simonton v. City of Pontiac, 268 Mich. 11, 255 N.W. 608 (1934).
369. Oio REV. CODE § 5705.49 (Baldwin 1954).
370. Adamson v. Little Rock, 199 Ark. 435, 134 S.W.2d 558 (1939).
371. Connors v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 128 (1879); Thomson v. City of Chadron,
145 Neb. 316, 16 N.W.2d 447 (1944).
372. State ex tel. Village of Buhl v. Borgen, 231 Minn. 317, 43 N.W.2d 95
(1950).
373. Town of Flagstaff v. Gomez, 29 Ariz. 481, 242 Pac. 1003 (1926); Menar
v. Sanders, 169 Ky. 285, 183 S.W. 949 (1916); Baker v. State ex rel. Napoleon,
39 N.M. 434, 49 P.2d 246 (1935); Morris v. Sheridan, 86 Ore. 224, 167 Pac. 593
(1917).
374. Wise v. First Nat'l Bank of Nogales, 49 Ariz. 146, 65 P.2d 1154 (1937).
375. State ex rel. Emerson v. Mound City, 335 Mo. 702, 73 S.W.2d 1017
(1934).
[ VOL. 8
MUNICIPAL POWER TO TAX
tax above the limitation to pay off contractual obligations.376 However,
the Michigan contractual provision is interpreted to authorize the legis-
lature to require municipal corporations to levy and collect taxes
necessary to pay bond issues regardless of the limitation in the con-
stitution or in city charters.
377
In some states the constitutional, statutory or charter limitation is
not applicable to non-property taxes or exercises. 378 In others, special
taxes of all kinds seem to be included within the governing limita-
tion.3 79 What municipal taxes are to be included is a question of in-
terpreting the wording of the enactment and the intent of the drafts-
men.
The contract clause of the United States Constitution will prevent
the imposition of state constitutional or legislative limitations upon
municipal taxation if the result is to prevent the payment of municipal
obligations incurred prior to that time, and state constitutional pro-
visions prohibiting legislative bodies from impairing the obligation
of contracts will invalidate legislative attempts to limit municipal
tax powers under the same circumstances. 380 And it has been ruled by
a federal court that where a city had power to levy taxes for the pay-
ment of a judgment when it was rendered, no subsequently imposed
tax limitation could preclude the levy of taxes sufficient to pay off the
judgment.381
Conclusion and Commentary
There is generally no lack of power in municipal corporations to
impose a real property tax and, although it is of diminishing im-
portance in the larger cities, it will probably continue to constitute
the most important single source of municipal tax revenue. Since
many municipal services, such as fire protection and sewage disposal
bear a very good relationship to real property values, it is fitting that
this tax be granted to and used by municipalities. Constitutional and
statutory exemptions from this tax should be re-examined and in many
cases repudiated. County and even state properties might well be
subjected to local taxes to more effectively make the larger group
support governmental services provided thereto. There is even less
to be said for state-imposed exemptions of private concerns for
376. United States v. County of Macon, 99 U.S. 582 (1878); City of Austin v.
Cahill, 99 Tex. 172, 88 S.W. 542 (1905).
377. Hazel Park v. Municipal Finance Comm'n, 317 Mich. 582, 27 N.W.2d
106 (1947).
378. People ex rel. Toman v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 Ill. 581, 44 N.E.2d 549
(1942); Ex parte Marler, 140 Okla. 194, 282 Pa. 353 (1929).
379. Vaughan v. City of Searcy, 199 Ark. 585, 135 S.W.2d, 319; Schneewind v.
City of Niles, 103 Mich. 301, 61 N.W. 498 (1894).
380. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (U.S. 1867); State ex rel. Markel
v. Columbus, 139 Ohio St. 351, 40 N.E.2d 145 (1942).
381. City of Wheeling v. John Casey Co., 89 F.2d 308 (4th Cir.), cart. denied,
302 U.S. 697 (1937).
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it can be doubted if they ever satisfy expectations in bringing and re-
taining industry, and they should be held violative of equal protection
and uniformity clauses when imposed by the legislature. The power
of municipal corporations themselves to exempt properties from the
tax must be spelled out much more specifically than at present, and
local officials in many instances need a good deal more resistance to
pressure from local groups desiring to escape the tax.
. With the shift in the nature of property from real to personal
municipal corporations should be given power to tax personalty.
Collections from business and financial institutions and manufactories
is relatively simple, but collection from individual residents can not,
to be effective, hinge upon divulgence alone. Sales, purchase and use
taxes have been authorized for municipal corporations in a number
of states but they are regressive and-on the municipal level-fairly
easy to avoid. The sales tax is potentially very productive, accounting
for 132 million dollars in 1950 in New York City, and power to levy
such a tax should be given to municipalities if, on policy levels, they
see fit to adopt it. Power should also be given to impose admissions
and amusement taxes. Such a tax produced 3.7 millions in Philadel-
phia in 1950, and is not particularly objectionable.
Especially, it seems to this writer, should municipal corporations
be empowered to levy income or earnings taxes. This is the most
effective method of making individuals who live outside a city but
earn therein contribute to the cost of services rendered them, such as
traffic control, police protection, fire protection and the like to their
places of employment. Furthermore, rates should be graduated and
courts finding this somehow objectionable to a state uniformity of
taxation clause should re-examine their position. As so levied, and as
embracing unearned as well as earned income, it is just and it is prac-
tical of administration at the municipal level. There is no doubt of
its productivity. Philadelphia's tax in 1948 at one percent brought in
thirty-one million, and in 1950 at one and a quarter percent it returned
thirty-seven and a half million. The national average yield from
twenty-four cities is approximately $12.93 per capita, with Toledo pro-
ducing the highest per capita return from a one per cent tax, $19.93.
Municipal corporations in twenty-six states are authorized to levy
gross receipts taxes upon businesses, and a more limited gross receipts
tax upon utilities is found in thirty-three states. In 1950 the average
revenue produced in 196 municipal corporations by gross receipts
taxes averaged $5.08 per capita. Such taxes should be within
municipal power in all states. Somewhat comparable are the occupa-
tion and business taxes, sometimes referred to as "license" taxes. At
times selected groups of enterprises are taxed and here the problem
of equal protection is ever present, although the legislative judgment
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should be given great weight. In other cities all businesses are taxed,
often, as in New York City, measured by gross receipts. The tax there
produced over sixty million dollars in 1950. Municipal corporations
should be empowered to levy business and occupation taxes and also
such other utilized and effective taxes as cigarette or tobacco taxes, poll
taxes, deed transfer taxes, alcoholic beverage taxes, hotel accommo-
dation taxes, gasoline or motor fuel taxes, and motor vehicle taxes, all
of which have been used successfully and efficiently by municipal cor-
porations in this country.
The author is convinced that the power to tax problem can best be
solved by constitutional grant of home rule power to tax, interpreted
in some way comparable to the California experience, and giving
municipal authorities power to impose all taxes not specifically denied
to them by the people in the municipal charter. In non-home rule
states as well as in the "legislative" home rule jurisdictions municipal
power to tax can best be posited upon a broad legislative grant of
power to impose all taxes, as in Pennsylvania, free, however, of that
state's limitation denying municipalities power to tax the subjects of
state taxation. The whole doctrine of state pre-emption should be
repudiated. Furthermore, there is need and justification for Con-
gressional enactments subjecting at least some properties of federal
instrumentalities to local taxation.
On the level of constitutional limitations, present judicial interpre-
tation of both the tonnage and export-import clauses seems reasonable
and eminently fair to taxing municipalities. And it will not be error
if the commerce clause is used even more than presently to invalidate
local discriminations against the persons and products of interstate
commerce. The clause should, it is suggested, permit full taxation of
a carrier by the domicile plus reasonable taxation by any other
municipal corporation rendering protection and service to a carrier.
Both the commerce clause and the due process clause are fairly in-
terpreted today in reference to use taxes, but sales taxes should be
constitutional so long as ultimate delivery in a physical sense is made
by the seller or his agent into the municipal corporation. And a
municipality should under due process be permitted to force a foreign
corporation to collect for it the sales or use tax in a transaction involv-
ing a purchase by a resident of the corporation when the foreign
corporation has sufficient contracts with the state to make it ap-
pear fair and reasonable that it collect.
The author feels that gross receipts taxes upon local concerns en-
gaged in interstate commerce should not be struck down simply be-
cause they are gross receipts taxes, but that municipal taxes measured
in this way should as so imposed be unconstitutional only when dis-
criminatory or amounting to unreasonable burdens upon that com-
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merce. Municipal taxation should not readily be invalidated by the
courts in the name of due process of law. The United States Constitu-
tional due process ban upon double taxation of tangibles should be
re-examined as today many chattels have contacts with multiple
municipalities justifying at least apportioned taxes by various munic-
ipal corporations. At least, automatic reference to the domicile of the
owner as justification for either denial or power to tax should be
severely questioned. The present rule regarding intangibles seems fair
to municipal corporations. The public purpose limitation should be
replaced by specific constitutional clauses banning the donation of
tax funds to private individuals. Once the state legislature, the munic-
ipal council and the electors of the corporation have approved taxation
for a particular property it is hardly appropriate that such taxes be set
aside on the theory that the property desired is not "public." And the
same can be said of constitutional mandates that municipal taxation
be for "corporate" or "municipal" purposes.
Present judicial interpretation of equal protection clauses is satis-
factory, with considerable weight being given to the municipal
classification and the clause being utilized to invalidate local taxes
only when the discrimination is extreme. Uniformity clauses should
not be interpreted to prevent graduation of rates in municipal income
or earning taxes. Not all municipal taxes upon those who would speak,
print, worship or assemble need be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth.
Certainly all local taxes upon the privilege of worshiping, speaking,
publishing and assembling should be invalid as the privilege comes
from no local government. However, net income taxes upon the in-
dividuals and corporations who engage principally in such endeavors
should not be unconstitutional, nor should taxes upon the property,
real or personal, of those who so engage unless they become unreason-
able burdens upon the communication of ideas or faith. Such a test,
quite comparable to the limitation presently utilized for the national
privilege of interstate commerce, should be practical and fair. All
constitutional controls upon the rate or amount of municipal taxes
should be eliminated in favor of more flexible controls in the hands of
state commissions or, in the case of home rule cities, in the hands of
the local electors.
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